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INFORMATION DISCLOSURE AND 
THE UNION REPRESENTATION ELECTION
Matthew T. Bodie
In its oversight of union representation elections, the National Labor Relations 
Board seeks to create “laboratory conditions” to determine “the uninhibited 
desires” of employees.  Despite the Board’s intrusive regulation of union and 
employer campaign conduct, the Board does nothing to insure that employees 
get basic information relating to their decision.  Given the flaws in the market 
for union representation, particularly with respect to conflicts of interest, the 
Board should take a more aggressive role in ensuring that employees get the 
information they need to make rational representation decisions.  This Article 
proposes a new system of mandatory disclosure, modeled on disclosure regimes 
such as in federal securities regulation, in order to ferret out fraud, provide 
employees with critical information, and restore worker confidence in unions.
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INTRODUCTION
Last year, for the first time in almost half a century, the percentage of 
private sector unionization did not decline.1  This was big news.  Since 
1 See U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, News Release, Union 
Membership in 2005, January 20, 2006, available at: 
http://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/union2.pdf [hereinafter BLS News Release] 
(noting that the rate of private sector unionization had declined every year from 1983 
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the 1950s the percentage of private sector employees who are union 
members has been steadily and seemingly inexorably falling.  At its peak, 
union members represented more than a third of the workforce.2  By 
1983, only a fifth were unionized; now, less than thirteen percent are 
union members.3  Only 7.8 percent of private sector employees are in a 
union.4
The pressure of continued losses has driven union leadership to make 
organizing their top priority.  In 1995, the AFL-CIO elected John 
Sweeney on a platform of increased outreach and renewed organizing 
efforts.5 His tenure has been marked by a greater attention and resources 
devoted to organizing efforts.6  Despite these efforts, union membership 
continued to decline.  By 2005, there was sufficient disenchantment with 
Sweeney’s efforts that several of the biggest unions in America, including 
the Service Employees International Union and the Teamsters, left the 
AFL-CIO and formed a new coalition.7
Labor’s organizing failures have also confounded labor law scholars.8
Given that the labor laws were enacted to give workers an advantage in 
negotiating with employers, it seems puzzling that workers are less and 
less interested in taking advantage of those laws.  Even critics of the labor 
law regime concede that employees have strong economic incentives for 
exploiting the potential monopoly power that unionization provides.9  The 
until this year).  For statistics prior to 1983, see LEO TROY & NEIL SHEFLIN, UNION 
SOURCEBOOK: MEMBERSHIP, STRUCTURE & FINANCE DIRECTORY app. A at A-1 (1985).
2 MICHAEL GOLDFIELD, THE DECLINE OF ORGANIZED LABOR IN THE UNITED STATES 10 
(1987); TROY & SHEFLIN, supra note 1, at A-1.
3
 BLS News Release, supra note 1.
4 Id.
5
 Marion Crain & Ken Matheney, Labor’s Identity Crisis, 89 CAL. L. REV. 1767, 1784-
85 (2001).
6 Id. at 1785 (“Since Sweeney's ascendance to the presidency . . . , the AFL-CIO has 
made significant progress in revitalizing itself through a renewed commitment to 
organizing.”).
7
 George Raine, Dissident Unions Put the Focus on Organizing, S.F. CHRON., July 31, 
2005, at E1.
8 See, e.g., Cynthia A. Estlund, The Ossification of American Labor Law, 102 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1527, 1529 (2002) (“Why has organized labor's share of the workforce shrunk 
so dramatically?”).
9 See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, A Common Law for Labor Relations: A Critique of the 
New Deal Labor Legislation, 92 YALE L.J. 1357, 1381-82 (1983) (discussing the 
potential monopoly power of unions).  
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question thus becomes: given these incentives, why have fewer and fewer 
employees chosen to join unions?10
The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) provides the legal 
framework for employees to choose whether to have collective 
representation in their relationship with the employer.  Under the NLRA, 
a majority vote determines whether the employees will or will not have a 
labor organization11 as their representative at the bargaining table.12
Although the vote is a collective process, each employee must make an 
individual choice – through a secret ballot – as to whether she wants such 
representation.  The National Labor Relations Board has famously 
likened the representation election process to “a laboratory in which an 
experiment may be conducted, under conditions as nearly ideal as 
possible, to determine the uninhibited desires of the employees.”13
The Board has spent seventy years refining the conditions of this 
laboratory.  Countless Board decisions have parsed what an employer 
may predict about the effects of unionization; what the employer may 
promise to its employees during the pre-election “campaign” period; what 
unions may promise to prospective members; and what effects a 
misrepresentation will have on the parties.  What is notable for its 
absence, however, is the lack of any requirements that certain information 
be disclosed to employees.  Instead, the Board’s primary concern has 
been curtailing certain types of information that it deems to have a 
coercive or otherwise adulterating influence.  The Board implicitly 
assumes that the campaign between the union (in favor of its election 
petition) and the employer (presumably opposed to the election petition) 
will generate sufficient information for the employees to make an 
informed and rational decision.
10
 This puzzlement might be characterized as the “What’s the matter with Kansas?” 
question for labor scholars.  Cf. THOMAS FRANK, WHAT’S THE MATTER WITH KANSAS? 
HOW CONSERVATIVES WON THE HEART OF AMERICA (2004) (asking why Kansans vote 
against their economic self-interest).  Frank took his title from a Samuel Gompers article 
decrying Kansas legislation restricting the right to strike.  Samuel Gompers, What’s the 
Matter with Kansas?, 27 AM. FEDERATIONIST 155, 156 (1920).
11
 The Act defines a "labor organization" as "any organization of any kind . . . in which 
employee participate and which exists for the purpose, in whole or in part, of dealing 
with employers concerning grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours of 
employment, or conditions of work."  29 U.S.C. § 152(5) (2000).
12 Id. § 159.
13 General Shoe Corp., 77 NLRB 124, 127 (1948).
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This article challenges that assumption.  In evaluating the regulation 
of the representation campaign, both the Board and the majority of 
commentators have based that their analyses of representation elections 
on the model of a political campaign.14  This analogy is only natural, as 
the election is conducted much the same way as an election for political 
office.  However, this comparison is misguided.  Instead of seeing the 
representation election as the end result of a political campaign, the 
election should be treated as a collective economic decision about 
whether to engage in a certain kind of activity.  It is, in fact, a choice to 
“purchase” union representation services.
Viewed in this manner, it becomes clear that the actors in the 
“market” – namely, unions and employers – may not always provide the 
information necessary for employees to make rational decisions about 
union representation.  As will be discussed, unions and employers do not 
have the proper incentives to disclose certain types of information that 
might be material to employees.  In order to make the market more 
efficient, policymakers should consider a regime of mandatory, up-front 
disclosure.
In Part I, the article considers the current regulatory framework for 
representation elections.  This framework, based on the “laboratory 
conditions” model, is fairly complex but relies almost exclusively on 
prohibitions against certain types of speech or activity.  Part II explores 
important academic commentary that has suggested new approaches to 
this framework.  One school of commentators believes that the NLRB has 
layered on too much regulation, while another believes that the NLRB 
has not done enough to rein in employer abuses.  However, both 
ultimately provide incomplete answers by overlooking the role of 
information in the representation campaign.  Part III discusses reasons to 
suspect that employees are not getting the information they need to make 
rational economic decisions about union representation.  Part IV contrasts 
this lack of information with the regime of mandatory disclosure 
currently imposed upon unions under the Labor-Management Reporting 
and Disclosure Act (LMRDA).  Drawing in part on the established 
LMRDA framework, Part V then applies an information-disclosure model 
to the representation process and sets forth the beginnings of a new 
disclosure regime.
14 See, e.g., Derek C. Bok, The Regulation of Campaign Tactics in Representation 
Elections under the National Labor Relations Act, 78 HARV. L. REV. 38 (1964).
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PART I: REGULATING THE REPRESENTATION ELECTION
A.  The Basic Framework
Under the system established by the NLRA, the representation 
process begins with a petition – filed by employees, a labor organization, 
or an employer – avowing that a group of employees wish to be 
represented by a particular labor organization.  The petition proposes a 
particular “bargaining unit” of employees – namely, a group of 
employees that are deemed to share collective interests in the terms and 
conditions of employment.15  The petition is generally accompanied by 
evidence that employees support an election to determine the labor 
organization’s status.  At least thirty percent of the employees in the 
proposed bargaining unit must support an election before the Board will 
process the petition further.16  Pre-election hearings will be held if the 
employer or employees wish to challenge the appropriateness of the 
bargaining unit proposed by the petition.17  If the Board determines that 
the unit is appropriate, it will move ahead with a secret ballot election.18
If the employees vote in favor of representation, the labor organization is 
certified as the collective bargaining representative for all of the 
employees in the unit.19  Although dissenting employees are not forced to 
join the union, they may be forced to pay a pro rata share of the collective 
representation costs incurred on their behalf.20
The NLRA itself does not provide many specifics on the election 
process.  The 1935 Wagner Act21 only provided that the Board designate 
15 See Uyeda v. Brooks, 365 F.2d 326, 329 (6th Cir. 1966) (citing NLRB v. Ideal 
Laundry & Dry Cleaning Co., 330 F.2d 712 (10th Cir. 1964)).  A bargaining unit can 
consist of a small number of employees with a particular job description, or it can be all 
of an employer’s employees.
16 See 29 C.F.R. § 101.18(a) (2005).
17 Id. § 101.20(a).
18 Id. § 101.21.
19 See 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (2000).
20
 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (2000) (permitting employers to require union membership as a 
condition of employment); NLRB v. General Motors Corp., 373 U.S. 734, 744-45 
(1963) (permitting “agency shop” agreements whereby unions charge non-members for 
the costs of collective representation).
21
 The NLRA was created by the Wagner Act and has since been amended, most notably 
by the 1947 Taft-Hartley Act.
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a representative selected by a majority of the unit employees.22  Initially, 
the Board deemed evidence of employee sentiment presented at a hearing 
sufficient to certify a union as representative.23  However, by 1939 the 
Board had decided to require secret ballot elections to determine the will 
of the majority.24  This change was codified in the 1947 Taft-Hartley 
amendments, which provide that if a question of representation exists, the 
Board “shall direct an election by secret ballot and shall certify the results 
thereof.”25  Beyond the need for a secret ballot, the NLRA says little 
about the election or the regulation of the period prior to the election 
known as the “campaign period.”
Thus, the regulation of the election process was largely left to the 
Board to implement.  What exactly could be said, and what could not be 
said?  What would be the ramifications of prohibited conduct?  It was 
clear that under § 8(a)(1) of the NLRA, employers could not “interfere 
with, restrain, or coerce” employees who were exercising rights protected 
under § 7 of the Act.  If an employer’s campaign activities rose to the 
level of a § 8(a)(1) violation, they were undoubtedly prohibited.  But 
what about campaign activity that might intimidate or coerce employees, 
but did not violate § 8(a)(1)?  Congress had chosen to carve out a fairly 
big chunk of such conduct for protection through § 8(c) of the NLRA.
According to § 8(c), “the expression of any views, argument, or opinion” 
could not be deemed to an unfair labor practice “if such expression 
contain[ed] no threat of reprisal or force or promise of benefit.”26  This 
carve-out, intended in part to comply with the protections of the First 
Amendment, could have also designated the line between prohibited and 
permissible conduct during a representation campaign.
The Board chose to go in a different direction.  In General Shoe 
Corp., the Board established that "[i]n election proceedings, it is the 
Board's duty to provide a laboratory in which an experiment may be 
conducted, under conditions as nearly ideal as possible, to determine the 
uninhibited desires of employees."27  In so holding, the Board found that 
22 See Craig Becker, Democracy in the Workplace: Union Representation Elections and 
Federal Labor Law, 77 MINN. L. REV. 495, 507 (1993).  
23 Id. (noting that for the Board’s first five years roughly a quarter of all unions were 
certified as representative without an election).
24
 Cudahy Packing Co., 13 N.L.R.B. 526 (1939).
25
 29 U.S.C. § 159(c) (2000).
26
 29 U.S.C. § 158(c) (2000).
27 General Shoe, 77 NLRB at 127.
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conduct protected by § 8(c) could nevertheless be grounds for setting 
aside an election.  The Board rejected the claim that § 8(c) prohibited the 
Board from relying on conduct other than an unfair labor practice to 
overturn an election.28  Since the text of § 8(c) only spoke to the 
definition of an unfair labor practice, the Board did not view it as a 
limitation on the grounds for overturning an election.
General Shoe was not merely about the statutory application of § 8(c) 
in the election context.  It set forth a standard, a model, even a 
philosophy, about how to regulate the representation campaign.  The 
metaphor is one of scientific process: a “laboratory” for an “experiment” 
with “conditions as nearly ideal as possible” to determine the 
“uninhibited desires” of employees.  The messiness of the political 
campaign, at least here, is not in evidence; instead, the Board’s purpose is 
to remove anything that might obstruct or infringe upon the employees’ 
right to choose.  In deciding whether to invalidate an election, the Board 
stated that "our only consideration derives from the Act which calls for 
freedom of choice by employees as to a collective bargaining 
representative."29  Section 8(c)’s limitations on prohibited conduct were 
not sufficient.
What then were the requirements of this laboratory?  Although the 
Board continues to rely on the “laboratory conditions” metaphor, at times 
its allegiance to the underlying principle has been called into question.  
What follows is a brief overview of the Board’s regulation of speech and 
conduct during a representation campaign.
B. Prohibited Campaign Speech and Conduct
1. Coercion.  Much of what is prohibited in the context of a 
representation campaign is also a violation of § 8(a)(1).  The most 
obvious category of prohibited activity is coercion, either by union or by 
employer.  Any effort to compel the employee to vote a certain way is 
deemed not only an infringement on the laboratory conditions but also a 
trespass against employees’ protected rights.  Although threats of 
28 Id. at 127.
29 Id. at 126 (quoting P.D. Gwaltney, 74 NLRB 371 (1947)).  This sentiment is probably 
based on the Act’s Findings and Policies Section, which states that one of the declared 
policies of the Act is to “protect[] the exercise by workers of full freedom of association, 
self-organization, and designation of representatives of their own choosing . . . .”  29 
U.S.C. § 151.
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physical violence are certainly prohibited, the more common concern is 
threats of economic coercion by the employer.  An employer may not 
threaten to fire employees or change their working conditions if they 
support the union.30  A threat to close a plant because of union activity is 
also prohibited.31
However, the line becomes fuzzier when an employer is trying to 
convince employees of the negative consequences of union 
representation.  The employer is permitted to inform employees about the 
employer’s views on unionization, and unionization may in fact lead to 
certain events that would make it more likely for the employer to close a 
plant, perhaps out of economic necessity.  Such information would be 
important, perhaps critical, to an employee’s representation decision.  But 
an employer could easily frame threats and other coercion as campaign 
“predictions.”  Because the employer has the ultimate control over the 
fate of the plant, the employer’s prediction looks more like a threat.  
Thus, any regulation in this area must balance the free speech rights of 
the employer with the rights of employees to be free from economic 
coercion.
The Supreme Court broadly demarcated the boundaries of threat and 
prediction in NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co.32  The Court held that “an 
employer is free to communicate to his employees any of his general 
views about unionism or any of his specific views about a particular 
union, so long as the communications do not contain a threat of reprisal 
or force or promise of benefit.”33  An employer may even make a 
prediction about the impact unionization would have on the company.  
However, such a prediction “must be carefully phrased on the basis of 
objective fact to convey an employer’s belief as to demonstrably probable 
consequences beyond his control or to convey a management decision 
already arrived at to close the plant in case of unionization.”34  Any hint 
that the “prediction” is instead a statement about what an employer might 
30 See E.W. Grobbel Sons, 322 NLRB 304 (1996) (holding that a discontinuance of 
benefits was an unlawful reprisal).
31
 However, the employer may in fact shut down the plant after the election.  Textile 
Workers v. Darlington Mfg. Co., 380 U.S. 263, 274 n. 20 (1965).
32
 395 U.S. 575 (1969).
33 Id. at 618.
34 Id.  
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do solely on its own initiative would render such a prediction 
impermissible.
In practice, the difference between permissible predictions and 
unlawful threats has often rested on “fine distinctions.”35  Generally, an 
employer is allowed to make purely objective statements about what has 
happened in other unionized companies or what the employer’s customers 
have stated with regard to the effects of unionization.36  However, any 
interpretation of such “facts” that casts unionization in a negative light is 
apt to turn the prediction into coercion.  The Board and the U.S. Circuit 
Courts have often differed on where this line is to be drawn.  For 
example, in DTR Industries, the Board found that an employer violated § 
8(a)(1) through its pre-election letter which stated “our business would 
automatically be reduced if the union wins the election.”37  However, the 
Sixth Circuit refused enforcement, finding the letter to be a permissible 
prediction based on objective fact.38
The Board has also found predictions about the futility of union 
organizing are generally impermissible threats.  The Board reads such 
predictions as threats to engage in bad-faith bargaining and therefore 
threats to engage in illegal activity.39  However, employers are permitted 
to describe their own rights and remedies under the NLRA, even if such 
descriptions paint a gloomy picture of unionization.  For example, in what 
might be characterized as the “bargaining from scratch” argument, 
employers may tell employees that they are not required to agree to 
anything when bargaining with the union, and that they have as much a 
right to ask for wage and benefit reductions as the union has to ask for 
increases.40  However, an employer may not use this assessment as a 
threat to bargain in bad faith or a threat to reduce benefits illegally prior 
to bargaining.41  Similarly, an employer may offer an opinion about the 
possibility of union-called strikes, and may note that it has the right to 
35 PATRICK HARDIN & JOHN E. HIGGINS, JR., THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 131 (4th ed. 
2001).
36 Id. at 130-31.
37
 DTR Industries, 311 NLRB 833 (1993), enforcement denied, 39 F.3d 106 (6th Cir. 
1994).
38
 39 F.3d 106, 115 (6th Cir. 1994).
39 See, e.g., American Greetings Corp., 146 NLRB 1440, 1445 n.4 (1964).
40 See Fern Terrace Lodge of Bowling Green, 297 NLRB 8 (1989).
41 See, e.g., Golden Eagle Spotting Co., 319 NLRB 64 (1995); Advo Systems, 297 
NLRB 926 (1990).
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permanently replace employees who go out on strike.  Predictions of 
violence are also prohibited if depicted as the inevitable consequence of 
unionization.  However, the Board has upheld an employer’s right to state 
during a campaign that the union might send someone out to break 
employees’ legs in order to collect dues.42
Ultimately, there is no clear line between impermissible threats and 
permissible campaign rhetoric.  The Board has emphasized the need to 
look at the totality of the circumstances in figuring out where employer 
campaign conduct falls.  If the overall campaign has had a tendency to 
threaten employees with possible violations of their collective rights, then 
the Board will find a § 8(a)(1) violation and overturn the election.  
However, such determinations, based as they are on a multi-factor 
contextual test, will be subject to indeterminacy and uncertainty.  As 
such, they threaten either to under-deter coercive threats or over-deter the 
provision of information that may be material to the employees’ decision.
2. Promises and Grants of Benefits.  In keeping with its efforts to 
protect the “uninhibited desires” of employees, the NLRA also prohibits 
bribery.  The employer may not promise to better employees’ terms and 
conditions in exchange for support of or opposition to the union.  In a 
famous passage, the Supreme Court described the rationale for the 
prohibition this way:
The danger inherent in well-timed increases in benefits is 
the suggestion of a fist inside the velvet glove.  Employees 
are not likely to miss the inference that the source of 
benefits now conferred is also the source from which future 
benefits must flow and which may dry up if not obliged.43
The Board and the courts have interpreted § 8(a)(1) to prohibit 
suspiciously-timed benefits even when no strings are explicitly attached.  
In order to provide its employees with improved terms of employment
during the course of the representation campaign, the employer must 
show that its actions were motivated by factors other than the campaign.44
Clear evidence that the employer had been planning such an improvement 
42
 Sears Roebuck & Co., 305 NLRB 193 (1991).  
43
 NLRB v. Exchange Parts Co., 375 U.S. 405 (1964).
44
 American Sunroof Corp., 248 NLRB 748 (1980), enforced in part, 667 F.2d 20 (6th 
Cir. 1981).
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before notice of the campaign will allow the employer to proceed.  But if 
the benefit is discretionary, and the employer’s decision not dictated by 
its previous behavior, the Board may very well find an implicit attempt to 
interfere with the campaign.  So too may efforts by an employer to solicit 
or remedy employee grievances be deemed impermissible interference.45
The Board has determined that suggestion boxes and employee hotlines 
may amount to an implied promise to remedy employee grievances and 
thereby would be impermissible under § 8(a)(1).46  However, it should 
also be noted that any efforts to scale back on benefits that would have 
otherwise been granted (absent the campaign) would also be a § 8(a)(1) 
violation.  Thus, employers must tread carefully in this area: they may be 
liable for both decisions to grant benefits and decisions not to grant 
benefits, depending on the circumstances.
Union promises about securing certain terms and conditions have 
been held to be permissible, since employees, in the Board’s view, 
recognize that such promises are “dependent on contingencies beyond the 
Union’s control.”47  However, unions are not permitted to offer tangible, 
valuable benefits to employees in the context of a representation 
campaign.  Elections have been invalidated after union gifts of life 
insurance coverage,48 jackets,49 hats and shirts,50 and alcoholic drinks.51
Here, too, however, there has been indeterminacy.  One court ruled that a 
union’s promise to hold “the biggest party in the history of Texas” if it 
won was an impermissible inducement,52 while another held that a 
promise of a victory dinner dance was not objectionable.53  The Board 
and the courts have also wrestled over the permissibility of union lawsuits 
against employers on behalf of employees in the midst of a representation 
campaign.54
45 See, e.g., Bell Halter, Inc., 276 NLRB 1208 (1985).
46 See DTR Industries, 311 NLRB 833 (1993); Torbitt & Castleman, Inc., 320 NLRB 
907 (1996).
47
 Smith Co., 192 NLRB 1098, 1101 (1971).
48
 Wagner Elec. Corp., 167 NLRB 532 (1967).
49
 Owens-Illinois, Inc., 271 NLRB 1235 (1984).
50
 NLRB v. Shrader’s, Inc., 928 F.2d 194 (6th Cir. 1991).
51
 Revco D.S. v. NLRB, 830 F.2d 70 (6th Cir. 1987).
52
 Trencor, Inc. v. NLRB, 110 F.3d 268, 272 (5th Cir. 1997).
53
 NLRB v. L & J Equipment Co., 745 F.2d 224 (3d Cir. 1984).
54 See, e.g., Nestle Ice Cream v. N.L.R.B., 46 F.3d 578, 584 (6th Cir. 1995) (concluding 
that union lawsuit on behalf of employees for overtime pay was an impermissible bribe).
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Union offers to waive employee initiation fees have received 
sustained scrutiny from the Board and the courts.  The basic principle was 
established in NLRB v. Savair Manufacturing Co.,55 which held that 
unions cannot offer to waive initiation fees for employees who sign 
authorization cards before an election.56  The Court held that such a 
practice would allow the union to “buy endorsements and paint a false 
portrait of employee support during its election campaign.”57  However, 
the Court’s ruling did allow for the waiver of initiation fees more 
generally: specifically, the waiver had to be open “not only to those who 
have signed up with the union before an election but also those who join 
after the election.”58  As a result, the Board and circuit courts have been 
left to parse exactly what a union may say in conveying the waiver during 
the campaign.  The Board and the Seventh Circuit found the union’s 
waiver unobjectionable when it stated that it “usually does not charge an 
Initiation Fee” until some time after the election, despite the “usually.”59
However, when a union offered to waive fees only to “charter members” 
without explaining the term,60 or said that fees would be waived for 
“anyone joining now, during this campaign,”61 such promises were held 
to violate laboratory principles.  The Board permits unions to clarify or 
correct objectionable waiver offers but holds them to a fairly high 
standard of clarity.62
55
 414 U.S. 270 (1973).
56 Id. at 277.
57 Id.
58 Id. at 272 n.4.
59
 Certain-Teed Products Corp. v. NLRB, 562 F.2d 500 (7th  Cir. 1977), enforcing 225 
NLRB 971 (1976).
60
 Inland Shoe Mfg. Co., 211 NLRB 724 (1974).
61
 Crane Co., 225 NLRB 657 (1976).
62 See, e.g., Claxton Mfg. Co., 258 NLRB 417 (1981) (holding that letter promising no 
initiation fees “as of this day” was too ambiguous to clarify earlier impermissible waiver 
offer).  An interesting twist on the Savair line of cases involves one union’s requirement 
that a majority of employees prepay a reduced initiation fee and one month’s dues in 
order for the union to file an election petition.  Aladdin Hotel Corp., 229 NLRB 499 
(1977).  If the union lost the election, the prepaid amounts were forfeit to the union in 
order to pay for the costs of the campaign.  If the union won the election, it opened up 
the reduced initiation fees to all employees for a period of time after the election.  The 
Board, in a 3-2 decision, upheld the policy, finding that it offered the reduced initiation 
fee before and after the election.  Id. at 500.  In dissent, two members argued that the 
lock-in and forfeiture provisions would interfere with employees freedom of choice.  Id.
at 501-02 (Members Penello and Walther, dissenting).  The Ninth Circuit declined to 
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3. Inflammatory appeals.  As part of the laboratory conditions 
doctrine, the Board prohibits appeals to racial prejudice or pride that it 
deems too “inflammatory” for the campaign.  The seminal case in this 
area is Sewell Manufacturing Co.,63 in which the employer appealed to 
racial prejudice in its anti-union campaign efforts.  The employer linked 
the union to unrelated desegregation efforts and used a picture of a white 
union official dancing with a black woman in its campaign literature.64
The Board found such conduct to be grounds for a new election.  
According to the Board, racial appeals were only permissible if they were 
truthful, germane to the election, and not overly inflammatory.65
The Sewell standard has resulted in a hodge-podge of rulings that, as 
in other areas, lack the clarity and coherence necessary for uniform 
application.  The Board has generally applied a more lenient standard to 
appeals of racial pride and solidarity; indeed, such appeals may be a 
legitimate part of an effort to improve terms of pay and working 
conditions.66  However, the U.S. Courts of Appeal have been less 
forgiving and have clashed with the Board about such campaign tactics.67
The Board has also generally held that appeals to racial prejudice have to 
be “sustained” in order to meet the prohibited threshold, causing further 
disagreement.  Here too circuit courts have been more willing to overturn 
elections based on racist remarks despite the Board’s willingness to 
enforce the Board’s order after finding the union’s letter to be ambiguous as to the 
timing of the waiver offer.  NLRB v. Aladdin Hotel Corp., 584 F.2d 891 (9th Cir. 1978).
63
 138 NLRB 66 (1962).
64 Id. at 67.
65 Id. at 71-72.
66 See, e.g., Baltimore Luggage Co., 162 NLRB 1230, 1233 -34 (1967) (noting that 
appeals to racial unity may be “directed at undoing disadvantages historically imposed” 
and may be a way to “unify groups of employees by focusing group attention on 
common problems”).
67 See, e.g., NLRB v. Schapiro & Whitehouse, 356 F.2d 675 (4th Cir. 1966) (refusing to 
enforce bargaining order because of appeals to racial pride); KI (USA) Corp., 35 F.3d 
256, 260 (6th Cir. 1994) (denying enforcement of a bargaining order based on the 
union’s use of a letter by a Japanese businessman which allegedly inflamed racial 
tensions); Case Farms v. NLRB, 128 F.3d 841, 850 (4th Cir. 1991) (Willams, J., 
concurring in judgment) (expressing “concern with the Board's apparent disregard for 
the decisions of the Circuit Courts” in matters of concerning inflammatory racial 
appeals).
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tolerate limited instantiations of such behavior.68  The vague standards, 
combined with the concern that legitimate speech may be prohibited, 
have led to calls for reform of this doctrine.69
4. Misrepresentations.  The regulation of misrepresentations is 
perhaps the most infamous example of the Board’s willingness to depart 
from precedent, as demonstrated by a series of decisions in the 1970s 
which piled reversal on reversal on reversal.  Before we get to these 
cases, however, it is important to note what they are not about: namely, 
the Board’s overall approach to misrepresentations.  The Board has not 
wavered from its generally-held view that misrepresentations are not 
prohibited during the election campaign.  As the Board noted, 
“exaggeration, inaccuracies, half-truths, and name calling, though not 
condoned, will not be grounds for setting aside an election.”70  The Board 
stated: “absolute precision of statement and complete honesty are not 
always attainable in an election campaign, nor are they expected by 
employees.”71  Thus, unlike the strict rules of truthfulness in such 
contexts as the corporate proxy contest,72 the Board has taken a relatively 
relaxed approach to misrepresentations throughout its history.
From 1962 to 1977, the Board did regulate a subset of 
misrepresentations that it felt had a particularly nefarious effect on the 
representation campaign.  The rule, established in Hollywood Ceramics 
Co.,73 stated:
[A]n election should be set aside only where there has been 
a misrepresentation or other campaign trickery, which 
involves a substantial departure from the truth, at a time 
which prevents the other party or parties from making an 
effective reply, so that the misrepresentation, whether 
68 See, e.g., M&M Supermarkets v. NLRB, 818 F.2d 1567 (11th Cir. 1987); NLRB v. 
Eurodrive, 724 F.2d 556 (6th Cir. 1984); NLRB v. Triplex Mfg. Co., 701 F.2d 703 (7th 
Cir. 1983).  Cf. Clearwater Transport, Inc. v. NLRB, 133 F.3d 1004, 1010 (7th Cir. 1998) 
(voicing a “strong objection” to the NLRB’s “seemingly casual reading” of past 
precedent in such cases).
69 See, e.g., Shepard Tissue, Inc., 326 NLRB 369, 369-73 (1998) (Gould, Chairman, 
concurring) (arguing for a new approach to the Sewell doctrine).
70
 Hollywood Ceramics Co., 140 NLRB 221, 226 n.6 (1962).
71 Id. at 223.
72 See SEC Rule 14a-9, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (2004).
73
 140 NLRB 221 (1962).
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deliberate or not, may reasonably be expected to have a 
significant impact on the election.74
Thus, a simple misrepresentation was clearly not enough to negate the 
campaign.  The election objection would be struck if the 
misrepresentation concerned an unimportant matter or had no significant 
impact or was made at a time that allowed for effective rebuttal or 
correction.  A misrepresentation would also be insufficient to overturn the 
election if it was so exaggerated as to be unbelievable or if employees had 
sufficient information already to permit them to evaluate the 
misrepresentation properly.75  Obviously, many of these factors are 
subject to vagaries of interpretation: “substantial departure,” “significant 
impact,” sufficient time for an “effective reply.”  Once again, the Board’s 
standard was subject to the usual criticisms.76
The Board overruled Hollywood Ceramics in its 1977 Shopping Kart 
decision.77  In that decision, the Board washed its hands of any regulation 
of campaign misrepresentations.  In coming to its conclusion, the Board 
cited several academic works, including two pieces discussed below.78
Noting that the Hollywood Ceramics rule had been criticized for its 
vagueness and indeterminacy, the Board argued that such attention to 
campaign propaganda was unnecessary.  In fact, it argued that “Board 
rules in this area must be based on a view of employees as mature 
individuals who are capable of recognizing campaign propaganda for 
what it is and discounting it.”79  To hold otherwise would be to 
countenance “a view of employees as naive and unworldly whose 
decision on as critical an issue as union representation is easily altered by 
the self-serving campaign claims of the parties.”80  The three-member 
majority, citing studies about actual employee behavior during election 
74 Id. at 224.
75 Id.
76
 Bok, supra note DB1.
77
 Shopping Kart Food Market, 228 NLRB 1311 (1977).
78 Julius Getman & Stephen Goldberg, The Behavioral Assumptions Underlying NLRB 
Regulation of Campaign Misrepresentations: An Empirical Evaluation, 28 STAN. L. 
REV. 263 (1976); Bok, supra note DB1; ROBERT E. WILLIAMS, PETER A. JANUS, AND 
KENNETH C. HUHN, NLRB REGULATION OF ELECTION CONDUCT (1974).
79 Shopping Kart, 228 NLRB at 1313.
80 Id.
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campaigns,81 felt that employees could properly evaluate the truth and 
falsity of campaign claims themselves.82
A year later, the Board reversed course, and a three-member majority 
in General Knit of California returned to the Hollywood Ceramics 
standard.83  The majority took on the principles enunciated in Shopping 
Kart, stating that the Shopping Kart majority was “in error” as to its basic 
view of campaign behavior.84  The Hollywood Ceramics standard, 
according to the majority, was not premised on a view that employees 
were “naïve and unworldly.”85  Instead, the majority argued that “no 
matter what the ultimate sophistication of a particular electorate, there are 
certain circumstances where a particular misrepresentation or 
misrepresentations may materially affect an election.”86  Accordingly, 
“employees should be afforded a degree of protection from overzealous 
campaigners who distort the issues by substantial misstatements of 
relevant and material facts within the special knowledge of the 
campaigner, so shortly before the election that there is no effective time 
for reply.”87  The dissenters-turned-majority jousted with the empirical 
studies cited by the Shopping Kart majority,88 and argued that the old 
standard could be enforced in a vigorous yet consistent manner.89
Four years later, however, the hands-off policy of Shopping Kart was 
yet again reinstated by a three-member Board majority in Midland 
81 Id. (citing Getman & Goldberg, supra note JG2, at 276-79).  The dissenting Members 
took issue with the majority’s use of the study, noting inter alia that 22 percent of 
employees had “precise recall” (within ten percent) of union claims about wages made 
by union employees elsewhere.  Shopping Kart, 228 NLRB at 1315-16 (Fanning & 
Jenkins, Mems., dissenting in part).  One of the dissenters then separately wrote to 
criticize the study itself.  Id. at 1318 (Jenkins, Mem., dissenting) (criticizing the Getman 
& Goldberg article for “nonprobative factual data and non sequitur logic”).
82
 However, one member of the majority wrote in concurrence that she would set aside 
an election if there had been an “egregious mistake of fact.”  Id. at 1314 (Murphy, 
Chair., concurring).
83 General Knit of California, 239 NLRB 619 (1978).
84 Id. at 620.
85 Id.
86 Id.
87 Id. (quoting Shopping Kart Food Market, 228 NLRB 1311, 1315 (1977) (Fanning & 
Jenkins, Mems., dissenting in part)).
88 General Knit, 239 NLRB at 621-22.
89 Id. at 622-23.
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National Life Insurance Co.90  After reviewing the history of the Board’s 
treatment of misrepresentations,91 the majority argued in favor of the 
bright-line, hands-off standard, citing the “many difficulties attending the 
Hollywood Ceramics rule,” as well as the need for “the certainty and 
finality of election results.” 92  Although the majority reaffirmed the view 
that “mature individuals who are capable of recognizing campaign 
propaganda for what it is and discounting it,”93 it did not spend much 
time on this issue, nor did it refer to the empirical studies debated in 
Shopping Kart and General Knit.  The majority did make clear that the 
Board still would overturn election in instances “where a party has used 
forged documents which render the voters unable to recognize 
propaganda for what it is.”94
The decision in Midland remains the law.  Interestingly, some circuit 
courts have been rather grumbling in their acceptance of the Midland
standard.  In NLRB v. New Columbus Nursing Home,95 the First Circuit 
endorsed the Board’s holding below, but noted that “we do not 
necessarily endorse application of the Midland rule to situations involving 
charges of more fundamental and clear-cut misrepresentations.”96
Noting that the Board had “a duty to provide reasonably for the 
employees' ‘unhampered freedom of choice,’” the court held that a strict 
adherence to Midland might, in some cases, “constitute legal error.”97
Similarly, the Sixth Circuit has held that "[t]here may be cases where no 
forgery can be proved, but where the misrepresentation is so pervasive 
and the deception so artful that employees will be unable to separate truth 
from untruth and where their right to a free and fair choice will be 
affected."98  The Sixth Circuit continues to apply this standard to 
90
 Midland Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 263 NLRB 127 (1982).
91 Id. at 129-30.
92 Id. at 131.
93 Id. at 132 (quoting Shopping Kart, 228 NLRB at 1313).
94 Midland, 263 NLRB at 133.
95
 NLRB v. New Columbus Nursing Home, 720 F.2d 726 (1st Cir. 1983).
96 Id. at 729.
97 Id. (citation omitted).  In concurrence, Judge Bailey Aldrich wrote: “Midland seems to 
be burning down the barn to get rid of the rats; an abnegation of the Board's recognized 
duty to ensure a fair and free choice of bargaining.”
98
 Van Dorn Plastics Machinery Co. v. NLRB, 736 F.2d 343, 348 (6th Cir. 1984).
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misrepresentation cases.99  While other circuit courts have adopted the 
Midland standard,100 a number of circuit courts, including ones in circuits 
that have adopted it, have not yet decided whether to “fully support” the 
standard.101
C. Information Disclosure in the Representation Campaign
Despite the finely-grained regulation of what cannot be said during 
the representation campaign, the Board has done little to require 
information disclosure from the parties.  There are no affirmative 
disclosure requirements on the part of employers or unions to provide 
certain kinds of information to employees.  In Florida Mining & 
Materials Corp., the Board rejected the employer's efforts to impose an 
"affirmative disclosure" requirement on the pre-election process.102  In 
that case, the union failed to reveal to the employees that the day before 
the election, it had been placed under temporary trusteeship by the 
international union.  The employer sought to overturn the election based 
on the union's failure to disclose.  The authority of the Board to impose 
such a rule was not questioned; however, the Board refused to do so 
based on its concerns about the administrative burden it would cause.  
The Fifth Circuit found that the Board had not abused its discretion.103
The only instance of such required disclosure is not information that 
must be disclosed to employees, but rather information that the employer 
must disclose to the petitioning union.  In Excelsior Underwear, Inc., the 
99 See N.L.R.B. v. St. Francis Healthcare Centre, 212 F.3d 945, 963-66 (6th Cir. May 19, 
2000); N.L.R.B. v. Hub Plastics, Inc., 52 F.3d 608, 611-13 (6th Cir. May 08, 1995).
100
 C.J. Krehbiel Co. v. NLRB, 844 F.2d 880, 883-84 (D.C. Cir. 1988); State Bank of 
India v. NLRB, 808 F.2d 526, 538-39 (7th Cir. 1986); NLRB v. Semco Printing Ctr., 
Inc., 721 F.2d 886, 892 (2d Cir. 1983); NLRB v. Monark Boat Co., 713 F.2d 355, 360 
(8th Cir. 1983); NLRB v. Yellow Transp. Co., 709 F.2d 1342 (9th Cir. 1983).
101
 Trencor Inc. v. NLRB, 110 F.3d 268, 276 (5th Cir. 1997) (holding that it was 
“unnecessary to determine the full scope of this court’s support for the Midland
doctrine”).  See also NLRB v. Dave Transportation Co., 1999 WL 196545, at *1 n.1 (9th
Cir. April 1, 1999) (unpublished) (noting that they need not decide whether an exception 
to Midland is warranted); St. Margaret Memorial Hosp. v. N.L.R.B., 991 F.2d 1146, 
1158 (3d Cir. 1993) (noting in dicta that the Midland rule might not be sufficient in all 
cases); NLRB v. Affiliated Midwest Hospital, 789 F.2d 524, 528 n.3 (7th Cir. 1986) 
(noting that it need not reach the issue of whether the circuit should recognize an 
exception to Midland).
102 Florida Mining & Materials Corp., 198 NLRB 601, enf'd 481 F.2d 65 (5th Cir. 1973).
103 Id.
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Board required employers to provide the union with the names and 
addresses of employees in the unit.104  This information is required within 
seven days of the approval of an election agreement; the Union need not 
request it.105  In explaining why it was requiring this information, the 
Board noted:
. . . [W]e regard it as the Board's function to conduct 
elections in which employees have the opportunity to cast 
their ballots for or against representation under 
circumstances that are free not only from interference, 
restraint, or coercion violative of the Act, but also from 
other elements that prevent or impede free and reasoned 
choice.  Among the factors that undoubtedly tend to impede 
such choice is a lack of information with respect to one of 
the choices available. . . . Accordingly, we think it is 
appropriate for us to remove the impediment to 
communication to which our new rule is directed.106
Thus, the primary justification for the Excelsior requirement is 
presumably to give the union the ability to send materials and other 
communications to the employees at their home address.  There is 
evidence that unions have taken advantage of the lists for this purpose.  In 
their empirical study of thirty-one union representation elections, 
Getman, Goldberg and Herman found that employers sent written 
materials to employees in twenty-six of those elections, while union sent 
written materials in twenty-five.107  In these elections, 92 percent of 
employees reported receiving employer material, while 85 percent 
reported receiving union material.108
Although the Excelsior decision was designed to facilitate greater 
information disclosure, in other respects the Board and the courts have 
104
 One commentator has proposed that unions be given private employee email 
addresses as part of the Excelsior disclosure.  G. Micah Wissinger, Informing Workers of 
the Right to Workplace Representation: Reasonably Moving from the Middle of the 
Highway to the Information Superhighway, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 331, 342-43 (2003).
105 Excelsior Underwear, Inc., 156 NLRB 1236, 1239-40 (1966).
106 Id. at 1240 (quotations and citations omitted).
107 JULIUS G. GETMAN ET AL., UNION REPRESENTATION ELECTIONS: LAW AND REALITY
90 (1976).
108 Id.
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failed to pursue this goal.  There is no structured forum in which the 
union is given a chance to make its case to employees.  If the union 
wishes to speak with employees, it must do so off-site and outside of 
working hours.  An employer, by contrast, can require employees to 
attend a meeting in which it presents an anti-union case.  Such meetings, 
known as “captive audience speech,” gives employers a much better 
opportunity to make their case to employees.109  In their study of 31 union 
representation elections, Professors Getman, Goldberg, and Herman 
found that employers held captive-audience meetings in 28 of those 
elections, making such meetings more frequent than the distribution of 
written materials.110  Employee attendance at such meetings was high.111
Although unions held off-site meetings in many of the 31 elections, a 
much smaller percentage of employees reported attending such 
meetings.112  The authors note that those employees who did attend union 
meetings were much more likely to be union adherents.113
Union access to employees even in public places can be restricted by 
the employer.  In Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB,114 the Supreme Court held that 
employers could prohibit all non-employee solicitation and distribution, 
including union solicitation, on its retail parking lot.  The Court ruled that 
the employer’s property rights trumped the union’s right to access unless 
the union could show that the employees could not be reached by other 
means.  The burden of proving such lack of access was a “heavy one,” as 
there was a presumption that the employees could be reached unless they 
actually lived on the employer’s property.115  A recent Board decision has 
109 See Alan Story, Employer Speech, Union Representation Elections, and the First 
Amendment, 16 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 356, 415 (noting the “obvious point that 
allowing employers to hold such meetings, especially absent an opportunity for the 
union to do likewise, gives employers a strong advantage over unions”).
110 GETMAN ET AL., supra note JG1, at 90-92.
111 Id.
112 Id.  As part of their reforms, Professors Getman, Goldberg and Herman propose that 
unions be given the opportunity for equal access to employees during working hours if 
employers use working time for their campaign.  Id.
113 Id.
114
 502 U.S. 527 (1992).
115 Id. at 535, 540.  This Board and the courts have permitted union access on employer 
property for employees working at a remote lumber camp, NLRB v. Lake Superior 
Lumber Corp., 167 F.2d 147 (6th Cir. 1948); in a company town, NLRB v. Stowe 
Spinning Co., 336 U.S. 226 (1949); and at a fish cannery, Chugach Alaska Fisheries, 
295 NLRB 44 (1989). 
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extended Lechmere to allow a grocery store to prohibit nonemployee 
union organizers from using the snack bar in its store.116
Employers are allowed considerable leeway in restricting the flow of 
information between employees.  Although employees are able to solicit 
their fellow workers on the job, employers can restrict such solicitations 
to non-working hours.117  Moreover, the employer may limit employees 
to oral solicitations in working areas.118  The employer can forbid the 
distribution of literature in working areas due to the threat of litter and 
disruption of productive order.119  Such a prohibition must apply to all 
such distributions, and it must be applied neutrally.120  An employer can 
also extend non-discriminatory literature prohibitions to company bulletin 
boards121 and even computer screen savers.122  An employer also has the 
right to prohibit solicitations, including union solicitations, on its own 
internal e-mail, as long as it does so non-discriminatorily.123
Finally, it is perhaps unnecessary to note that the Board itself takes no 
role in disseminating information during the representation campaign.  
One might envision a much more active Board which served as a 
repository for information about the campaign and took steps to make 
sure employees received that information.  For example, the SEC plays 
such a role with corporate disclosure: its EDGAR system offers free and 
simple access to millions of corporate documents regarding IPOs, annual 
statements, and proxy contests.124  The possibility that the NLRB might 
be able to play a similar role in the representation context will be 
discussed further below.
D.  The Neutrality Agreement: Opting Out of the Board’s Process
Any discussion of the representation election would be incomplete 
without reference to the growing importance of neutrality agreements.  
116
 Farm Fresh, 326 NLRB 997 (1998).  For criticism of the Lechmere decision, see 
Cynthia L. Estlund, Labor, Property, and Sovereignty after Lechmere, 46 STAN. L. REV.
305 (1994).
117
 Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793 (1945).
118
 Stoddard-Quirk Mfg. Co., 138 NLRB 615 (1962).
119 Id.
120 See, e.g., Marathon LeTourneau Co. v. NLRB, 699 F.2d 248 (5th Cir. 1983) (XXX).  
121
 Honeywell, Inc., 262 NLRB 1402 (1982).
122
 St. Joseph’s Hospital, 337 NLRB 94 (2001).
123
 E. I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 311 NLRB 893, 919 (1993).
124 See SEC Filing & Forms (EDGAR), available at: http://www.sec.gov/edgar.shtml.
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The neutrality agreement is a contract between a union and an employer 
in which the employer agrees to remain neutral while the union endeavors 
to win the support of a majority of employees.  Such agreements come 
with a range of procedures.  The simplest of these agreements only 
requires employer neutrality during the campaign, with the union then 
having to succeed in a Board-run election to obtain representation.  
However, some neutrality agreements also require the employer to 
recognize the union if it obtains signatures on representation cards from a 
majority of employees (known as a card-check majority).  This stronger 
form essentially allows the parties to opt out of the NLRB’s 
representation policies.  Unions began negotiating neutrality agreements 
in the 1970s and their popularity has substantially increased.  In a survey 
of four of the nation’s biggest unions, James Brudney found that “a 
plurality or majority of newly organized members have come in through 
contractual arrangements rather than traditional Board supervised election 
campaigns.”125  In fact, Brudney asserts that “[a]s a factual matter, Board 
elections have ceased to be the dominant mechanism for determining 
whether employees want union representation.”126
The attraction of neutrality agreements for unions is clear.  A recent 
study of neutrality agreements found that when such agreements included 
a card check provision, the union secured representation of the employees 
78 percent of the time.127  It is less clear why employers would agree to 
them.  In many cases, the employer has a preexisting relationship with the 
union as to other employees, and it can negotiate a neutrality agreement 
in the context of a larger series of negotiations.128  The most prominent 
neutrality agreements include ones in the telecommunications and auto 
125
 James Brudney, Neutrality Agreements and Card Check Recognition: Prospects for 
Changing Paradigms, 90 IOWA L. REV. 819, 829-30 (2005).
126 Id. at 824.
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 Adrienne E. Eaton & Jill Kriesky, Union Organizing Under Neutrality and Card 
Check Agreements, 55 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 42, 52 (2001).
128
 Adrienne E. Eaton & Jill Kriesky, Dancing with the Smoke Monster: Employer 
Motivations for Negotiating Neutrality and Card Check Agreements (Dec. 2002) 
(unpublished manuscript), cited in Brudney, supra note JB1, at 835; Roger C. Hartley, 
Non-Legislative Labor Law Reform and Pre-Recognition Labor Neutrality Agreements: 
The Newest Civil Rights Movement, 22 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 369, 387-89 
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industries, which have a high union density.129  Unions have also had 
some success in securing neutrality agreements through corporate 
campaigns.130  In addition, some state and local government agencies now 
require or encourage employers to sign neutrality agreements in order to 
be eligible for governmental contracts.131  In Las Vegas, the Hotel and 
Restaurant Employees (HERE) and the Service Employees International 
Union (SEIU) have used all three of these factors to support their drive 
for neutrality agreements to great success.132
Despite their increasing popularity, it is difficult to say how pervasive 
neutrality agreements may eventually become.  Employers who oppose 
unionization will not sign them voluntarily, and to this point unions have 
only been able to apply pressure in a limited spectrum of special 
circumstances.  It is possible that these circumstances may increase, but it 
is also possible that unions have exhausted many of them.  In addition, 
Congress has considered legislation to prohibit employer recognition 
based on a card-check majority.133  Although it seems unlikely that such a 
prohibition would pass, the most recent bill did garner fifty-seven co-
sponsors.  Finally, it is unclear whether the NLRB will accord deference 
to the results of a card-check certification mandated by a neutrality 
agreement.  In a recent order, the Board granted review of a case 
involving the application of the “recognition bar” doctrine in the context 
129 See, e.g., Rick Haglund, Union Foes Declare War on Neutrality Agreements, GRAND 
RAPIDS PRESS, Feb. 20, 2005, at G5 (discussing neutrality agreement within the 
automobile industry); Matt Richtel, In Wireless World, Cingular Bucks the Antiunion 
Trend, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 21, 2006, at C1 (discussing neutrality agreements at Cingular 
and SBC Communications).
130
 Eric Heubeck, New Organizing Methods: Card Check and Neutrality Agreements 
(Nov. 29, 1999), available at: 
http://www.enterstageright.com/archive/articles/1299unorg.htm (discussing various 
corporate campaigns).
131 See Brudney, supra note JB1, at 838 & n.85 (discussing laws, resolutions, or 
executive orders in California, New Jersey, Milwaukee, and San Jose); Hartley, supra
note RH1, at 392-95.
132
 Steven Greenhouse, Local 226, “The Culinary” Makes Las Vegas the Land of the 
Living Wage, N.Y. TIMES, June 3, 2004, at A22; Labor Research Association, Employer 
Neutrality and Card Check Recognition Get Results (October 1999), available at: 
http://www.laborresearch.org/story2.php/67.
133 See Secret Ballot Protection Act of 2004, H.R. 4343, 108th Cong. § 3 (2004); H.R. 
4636, 107th Cong. § 2 (2002).
INFORMATION & REPRESENTATION ELECTIONS
26
of a neutrality agreement.134  The Board has traditionally recognized that 
“voluntary recognition of a union in good faith based on demonstrated 
majority status will bar a petition for a reasonable period of time.”135
However, the majority in Dana distinguished the traditional rule by 
noting that such precedent “is based upon a union's obtaining signed 
authorization cards from a majority of the unit employees before entering 
into the agreement with an employer, while in both of the instant cases, 
an agreement was reached between the union and the employer before 
authorization cards, evidencing the majority status, were obtained.”136
Although it only granted review on the issue and made no final 
determination, the order still generated a strong dissent.137  If the Board 
ultimately disallows the recognition bar in the card-check neutrality 
agreement context, then employers and employees will be free to file 
decertification petitions soon after the employer has recognized the union 
through the card-check process.138
The strongest argument against neutrality agreement is the potential 
impairment of employee free choice.  Anti-union organizations and 
commentators have criticized neutrality agreements as opportunities for 
union intimidation and misinformation to carry the day.139  Critics of 
134
 Dana Corp., 341 N.L.R.B. No. 150, 2004 WL 1329345 (June 7, 2004).
135 See id. at *3 (Liebman & Walsh, Mems., dissenting) (citing Keller Plastics Eastern, 
Inc., 157 N.L.R.B. 583 (1966); Sound Contractors Assn., 162 N.L.R.B. 364 (1966)).
136 Id. at *1.
137 See id. at *2 -*8 (Liebman & Walsh, Mems., dissenting).
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card-check neutrality agreements have cited the lack of a “fully informed 
electorate”140 under such agreements as well as the need for employees to 
“hear[] views on as many sides of the issue as possible.”141  The NLRB 
itself echoed these concerns when it said that “the fact remains that the 
secret-ballot election remains the best method for determining whether 
employees desire union representation.”142  As I will discuss later,143
required disclosure in the context of a representation decision, whether it 
be a card check or a secret-ballot election, would alleviate many of the 
concerns raised by such procedures while preserving the features that 
make them attractive to unions and their proponents.
PART II: CRITICAL APPROACHES TO THE BOARD’S REPRESENTATION 
CAMPAIGN REGULATION
As others have noted in the past, there has been few prominent works 
of legal scholarship on the regulation of the union representation 
campaign.144  The four primary works can be broken down by decade: 
Derek Bok in the 1960s,145 Julius Getman, along with Stephen Goldberg 
and Jeanne Herman, in the 1970s,146 Paul Weiler in the 1980s,147 and 
Craig Becker in the 1990s.148  Although each of these works has its own 
focus, they sound primarily on two themes.  Bok and Getman focus on 
the administrative delay and inefficiency caused by the Board’s 
regulation of the labor campaign, while Weiler and Becker focus on 
employer campaign coercion that manages to survive Board regulation 
and defeat the free will of employees.  These articles, and their proposed 
reforms, are discussed below.
indication of whether they really want union representation.  The unions know this.
That's why they want card check elections instead of secret ballot elections.”).
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A. The Problem of Bureaucratic Obstruction: Derek Bok and Julius 
Getman et al.
Derek Bok is one of the most important labor law scholars of the past 
century.  Prior to becoming the president of Harvard University, Bok 
wrote a number of foundational articles at a time when labor law, as both 
a practical and academic subject, was at the peak of its own 
importance.149  Bok’s vision of labor law shared many commonalities 
with another labor law giant, Julius Getman.  An author of books and 
articles critical to the labor law pantheon, Getman shared Bok’s concern 
with administrative efficiency in the face of a growing bureaucracy.  
While supportive of the labor movement, both men might be better 
characterized as centrists in their approach to labor policy.
One of Bok’s most important articles was directly on the issue of the 
regulation of union representation elections.150  Bok’s approach to the 
issue centered on what he saw as the “instability” and “[i]nconsistencies” 
of the Board’s doctrine in the area.151  Bok felt that the inconsistencies 
reflected “a deeper uncertainty regarding the nature of the election 
process itself.”152  Bok also noted that in trying to keep the election 
campaign process free of coercion, the Board relied on inferences about 
human behavior that may or may not be supportable.153  He claimed that 
if the Board’s only guiding principle was to keep employee free from 
undue interference, the Board’s regulatory approach would continue to be 
incoherent and unstable.154  Instead, Bok argued that the Board should 
focus on a set of “legitimate interests” held by the parties involved.155
The first “legitimate interest” discussed by Bok is that of free choice.  
In this regard, he stated:
We may assume that one basic purpose of an election is to 
permit the voters to make as rational, and hence as 
accurate, a decision as they can concerning the issue before 
them.  In the context of a representation election, a rational 
149
 Bok, supra note DB1; Derek C. Bok, Reflections on the Distinctive Character of 
American Labor Law, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1394 (1971).
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154 Id. at 43, 45.
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decision implies that employees have access to relevant 
information, that they use this data to determine the 
possible consequences of selecting or rejecting the union, 
and that they appraise these possibilities in light of their 
own values and desires to determine whether a vote for the 
union promises to promote or impair their interests.156
Bok’s description of an employee exercising free choice describes the 
same process envisioned by law and economics models when rational 
actors are making cost-benefit decisions about economic choices.  After 
setting up this model, however, he immediately expressed skepticism 
about its correlation with reality.  Citing to works about the irrationality 
of decisions made in political elections, Bok acknowledged that perhaps 
the union representation decision is more suited to rational choice.157  But 
in the end, Bok believed there was little role for law in making the 
process more rational.
Bok arrived at this conclusion by breaking down an employee’s union 
representation decision into three questions: (1) Are conditions within the 
plant satisfactory?  (2) To what extent can the union improve on these 
conditions?  (3) Will representation by the union bring countervailing 
disadvantages as a result of dues payments, strikes, or bitterness within 
the plant?158  While employees may be “best equipped” to answer the first 
question, according to Bok, studies showed that employees misconceive 
the nature of their problems and may transfer concerns about other issues 
into an irrational focus on wages.159  As to the second question, Bok 
believed that the employee would be “hard pressed to decide to what 
extent a union can improve upon the situation.”160  Bok discussed how 
claims by the union about improvements at other companies would be 
rebutted by the employer in ways that employees would be “in a poor 
position to resolve.”161  Regarding the third question, Bok argued that 
employees would be “particularly handicapped” in resolving this issue, as 
156 Id. at 46.
157 Id. at 48.
158 Id. at 49.
159 Id. (citing BURLEIGH B. GARDNER & DAVID G. MOORE, HUMAN RELATIONS IN 
INDUSTRY (4th ed. 1964); F.J. ROETHLISBERGER & WILLIAM J. DICKSON, MANAGEMENT 
AND THE WORKER (1939)).
160
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the answer depended on resolving a series of sub-issues for which there 
would often be “little evidence beyond partisan statements of employers 
and organizers and the anecdotal accounts of associates . . . .”162
Bok thus made clear that he believed informational difficulties stood 
in the way of employees making rational representation decisions.  As 
Bok noted, employees generally have little direct, personal information 
about the union, and there is little such information or analysis in the 
media and other independent sources.  Given the lack of information on 
the critical questions posed by Bok, he argued that employees were not 
making rational economic decisions by sifting the evidence, but rather 
were basing their votes on factors irrelevant to a rational determination.  
As catalogued by Bok, such factors could include: the skillfulness of the 
union’s organizing strategy, the employer’s response to the organizing 
drive, the “likability” of both union and employer representatives, the 
opinions of certain “key employees” within the plant, community opinion 
of unions generally, and the background and past experiences of each 
employee.163  But ultimately, Bok concluded there was no rational 
economic calculus behind these elections.
Bok acknowledged that given the informational disparities, it might 
make more sense for government to play a more invasive role in the 
regulation of campaign information.164  However, Bok rejected this 
conclusion.  He concluded, first, that there are insufficient grounds for 
determining what kinds of regulation might actually assist in making 
more rational determinations.165  More importantly, however, Bok also 
believed that “[w]hen employees are unable to form a reasoned judgment 
on the effects of a union, given the complexity of the issues and the 
limited information at their disposal, no legal rule can lead them to a 
rational conclusion.”166  He thus concluded that efforts in this regard were 
doomed to failure – and thus, beyond a very limited extent, not worth 
pursuing in the first place.167
162 Id.
163 Id. at 51.
164 Id.
165 Id. at 52.
166 Id.
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This vision of government inadequacy ultimately led Bok to envision 
a much more limited role for the NLRB in regulating representation 
campaigns.  If employees are doomed to irrational choices, why spend 
time and money in an effort to establish pristine laboratory conditions?  
There is a contradiction here, which Bok recognized at various points in 
the paper: if such decisions are based on irrational factors, then even more 
of an effort should be made to remove improper or misleading campaign 
activities that may sway an employee’s final decision.168  But Bok 
believed that the factors that compel most employees’ decisions are 
established at the onset of the campaign, if not before.169  Thus, he 
ultimately sees the campaign as unimportant, and campaign regulation as 
a procedural hurdle to be minimized.170  Ultimately, it is the goal of 
administrative efficiency that Bok set as his polestar for his inquiry.
Although Bok thus rejected overall efforts to improve the rationality 
of employee choice, he did use the argument to support policy changes 
when such changes also would improve administrative efficiency.  In 
arguing that inflammatory speech should not be regulated, Bok cited to a 
psychological study finding that calm and rational arguments were more 
persuasive than emotional entreaties.171  Bok lauded the informational 
value of employer predictions about high dues and frequent strikes, 
noting “[t]he costs that might result from strikes and dues payments are 
clearly legitimate factors to be weighed by employees.”172  Similarly, Bok 
argued that employers should be free to grant benefits to employees in the 
midst of a campaign, not only because rational employees can discount 
the effect of such “bribes,” but also because such conduct provides 
further information about the two alternatives open to employees.173
Even misrepresentations or misleading remarks need not be policed if the 
other side is given an adequate opportunity to respond, thus increasing the 
168 Id. at 51, 73, 81, 84.
169 Id. at 88-90.
170 Id. at 62, 66.
171 Id. at 72 (citing Irving L. Janis & Seymour Feshbach, Effects of Fear-Arousing 
Communications, 48 J. ABNORMAL & SOC. PSYCH. 78 (1953)).
172 Id. at 79.  See also id. at 80-81 (noting an employer’s threat to bargain aggressively 
“may well convey an accurate impression of what is in store if a union is selected”).
173 Id. at 113-15.  See also id at 117-18 (arguing in favor of early recognition and 
agreements, as “employees are free to evaluate the agreement, weigh its terms against 
those negotiated elsewhere by the rival organization, and consider the arguments of the 
opposing union that even greater benefits will result under its leadership”).
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information available to employees.174  In this vein, Bok also noted a 
union’s lack of access to names and addresses as an obstacle in the 
process, and argued that the employer should be required to provide such 
information once the bargaining unit had been determined.175
In the end, Bok’s perspective offers a complicated and, I venture, 
contradictory set of perspectives and policy suggestions on the NLRB’s 
regulation of the union representation election.  He seemed to recognize 
the need to strong efforts against employer reprisals, noting in the 
conclusion that “an elemental fear of reprisal still poses the major threat 
to the free and fair elections contemplated by the act.”176  However, Bok 
was fairly nihilistic about efforts to truly effectuate rational employee 
choice, and his main concern is instead cutting down on bureaucratic 
interventions that delay the ultimate disposition of the election.  Although 
such a viewpoint supports his policy recommendations, it was hard for 
Bok to completely retreat from a rational actor model, and he ended up 
falling back onto it for support.  In the end, Bok’s prescription is 
superficially compelling but somewhat incoherent: he advocates a drastic 
cutback in regulation but seems unwilling to acknowledge any 
detrimental effects to such a cutback.
Twelve years later, Bok would write the forward to Union 
Representation Elections: Law and Reality by Julius Getman, Stephen 
Goldberg, and Jeanne Herman.  The book essentially summarized a large-
scale empirical investigation into the decisions made during a union 
representation election.  Putting the book into context, Bok wrote:
Earlier writers had seriously questioned the government’s 
policy of establishing detailed election rules to protect 
employee free choice from a long list of questionable 
campaign practices . . . . What Getman, Goldberg, and 
Herman have done is investigate the voting behavior of 
employees in a large number of elections to determine 
whether the Labor Board rules are really needed to 
guarantee a free and uncoerced choice.  Unlike many 
empirical studies, their work arrives at clearcut conclusions 
174 Id. at 91-92.
175 Id. at 99.
176 Id. at 140.
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that make a massive attack on the assumptions that support 
an entire body of regulatory law.177
The Getman et al. study did what Bok claimed it did: namely, provide 
an argument based on empirical data against most of the Board’s 
regulation of the representation campaign.  The book begins by noting 
that the Board bases its regulation on assumptions about human behavior 
untested by research.  The authors note that the Board’s model of voting 
behavior is based on the “free and reasoned choice” approach, and then 
provides a list of behavioral “assumptions” the Board makes about 
employees:  they are attentive to the campaign, they will interpret 
ambiguous statements by the employer as threats or promises, they are 
unsophisticated about labor relations, their free choice is fragile, and that 
the decision to sign or not sign a representation card is representative of 
employee support for the union.178  The purpose of the Getman et al. 
study was to test these assumptions against data taken from actual 
representation elections.
In a study remarkable for its breadth as well as for the administrative 
hurdles it overcame, the authors examined thirty-one union representation 
elections between 1972 and 1973.179  The authors orchestrated interviews 
of 1,239 employees who participated in these elections.180  The interviews 
were conducted in two waves; first, as soon as possible after the NLRB 
directed an election to take place, and then again after the election.181  In 
the first wave, interviewers sought to assess the employee’s pre-campaign 
sentiments about union representation, their own working conditions, and 
how they intended to vote.182  In the second wave, employees were asked 
how and why they voted as well as what they remembered from the 
representation campaign.183  The authors then analyzed the results to 
177 GETMAN ET AL., supra note JG1, at xi.
178 Id. at 7-21.
179 Id. at 33.  In order to get employees’ names and contact information for use in the 
study, the authors had to file a Freedom of Information Act claim against the Board.  Id.
at 36-37.  The Board refused to provide the information until compelled by the United 
States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit.  Id.
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determine what factors went into employees’ voting decisions, including 
the effects of employer and union campaign efforts.
The headline for the study is that the votes of 81 percent of the 
employees could be predicted from their pre-campaign attitudes about 
their job and about unions.184  The study also found that employees who 
had an intent to vote a particular way prior to the campaign generally 
ended up voting that way: 94 percent of employees intending to vote for 
the company did so, as did 82 percent of those intending to vote for the 
union.185  The authors were able to predict the outcome of 29 out of the 
31 elections based on how employees intended to vote.186  According to 
Getman and his coauthors, these results disprove the Board’s assumption 
that free choice is fragile and employees will be easily influenced by the 
campaign.  However, the authors also admit that 19 percent of employees 
were initially undecided (six percent) or voted contrary to their original 
intent (13 percent), and that the votes of this 19 percent were necessary 
for victory in nine out of the 31 elections.187  Of these groups, 76 percent 
of the switchers and 68 percent of the undecided voters ended up voting 
for the company.188
Getman, Goldberg, and Herman also studied to what extent 
employees could remember aspects of the union’s and employer’s 
campaigns and the salience of campaign issues to the employee vote.  
According to their study, employees recalled an average of three 
company campaign issues and two to three union campaign issues at the 
end of the campaign.189  Since the authors determined that there were 
around 25 to 30 issues each in the union and employer campaigns, they 
concluded that the roughly 10 percent recognition percentage displayed a 
“low level of familiarity” with the campaign process.190  Ten of the issues 
raised by companies had a 20 percent or higher recognition rate, but none 
had higher than 40 percent.191  The most recognized issue was 
“improvement not dependent on unionization,” followed by “new 
company/management recently taken over” and “plant closing/moving 
184 Id. at 62.
185 Id. at 64.
186 Id.
187 Id. at 103.
188 Id. at 111.
189 Id. at 76.
190 Id.
191 Id. at 78.
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may follow unionization.”192  Union issues fared substantially better at 
the top: “wages unsatisfactory; union will improve” was recognized by 71 
percent of employees, while 64 percent recognized “union will prevent 
unfairness, set up grievance procedure/seniority system.”193  However, 
only six of the twenty-five union issues were recognized by more than 20 
percent of respondents.194
Getman and his coauthors also found that several factors 
corresponded with campaign familiarity.  Union supporters were 
generally more informed about both campaigns.  More union voters (47 
percent) reported employer discussion of the potential for job loss 
stemming from a union victory than company workers (24 percent).195
Union supporters were also much more likely to attend union meetings, 
and such attendance was strongly correlated with familiarity.196
However, 83 percent of employees attended company meetings, while 
only 36 percent of employees attended union meetings.197  Exposure to 
written campaign material also contributed significantly to familiarity; 
employees who received campaign literature recalled roughly double the 
number of issues than those who did not.198
The study also found a high correspondence between reasons for the 
employees’ votes and campaign issues in those elections.  According to 
the study, 84 percent of the reasons given by union voters and 71 percent 
of the reasons given by voters against the union were issues raised in the 
preceding campaign.199  However, the authors found no corresponding 
relationship between election success and campaign characteristics.200
The study did find that the subset of employees who switched their votes 
from intending to vote for the company to a union vote, or who went from 
undecided to a union vote, recalled significantly more about the union 
campaign.201  The authors believed that this result was explained by the 
high level of attendance at union meetings by employees in these 
192 Id.
193 Id. at 80.
194 Id.
195 Id. at 87-88.
196 Id. at 91
197 Id. at 96.
198 Id. at 89-90.
199 Id. at 97.
200 Id. at 101.
201 Id. at 103.
INFORMATION & REPRESENTATION ELECTIONS
36
groups.202  However, the authors could not determine the causal 
relationship between switch, familiarity, and attendance at union 
meetings.203  Undecideds and switchers who voted for the company were 
not significantly more familiar with the company’s campaign.204
The authors also specifically examined the effects of unlawful 
employer campaigning on representation election results.  The study 
found that employers had engaged in unlawful campaigning in 22 out of 
the 31 elections.205 In nine of those elections, the employer committed 
campaign violations serious enough to warrant a bargaining order.206
Despite this high level of misconduct, however, the study found generally 
no correlation between voting behavior and this illegal activity.  While 
noting that employees who signed union cards did in fact vote in 
significantly higher numbers against the union in elections marred by 
unlawful campaigning, the authors detected no such effects on employees 
who were undecided, employees who intended to vote for the union, or 
employees whose prior attitudes predicted a union vote.207  Even the 
firing of union supporters did not result in a significant change in voting 
behavior.208
Based on these results, Getman, Goldberg, and Herman argued for a 
serious overhaul in the Board’s regulation of representation campaigns.  
Since 81 percent of employees voted according to their pre-election 
attitudes about working conditions and unions, the authors believed that 
the importance of the pre-elections campaign was seriously overblown.  
This conclusions was supported by the authors’ findings that employees 
remembered only a small percentage of issues from the campaign and, 
therefore, were “not generally attentive to the campaign.”209
Interestingly, they state the following about employee “rationality” with 
regard to the campaign:
The fact that employees do not pay close attention to the 
campaign does not mean that the voting decision is 
202 Id. at 104-05.
203 Id. at 105-06.
204 Id. at 108.
205 Id. at 111-13.
206 Id. at 113.
207 Id. at 115-16.
208 Id. at 125-26.
209 Id. at 140.
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irrational.  An employee who votes consistently with his 
pre-campaign attitudes is acting in a wholly rational 
manner.  His choice, to be sure, may not be reasoned in the 
sense in which the Board contemplates – based on a careful 
weighing of the campaign arguments put forth by each 
party – but that does not make it any less rational.210
The authors are thus largely in the “predestination” camp: the 
campaign will not affect the way most voters vote.  Even employer 
attempts at coercion seem to have no effect on voting patterns.  Given 
these findings, the authors argue that the Board should drastically cut 
back on its regulation of representation elections.  Campaign speech, 
according to the authors, “should be as free of governmental restrain as 
speech in political elections.”211  As the authors note, “[b]oth the 
employee voter and the political voter appear less interested in the 
campaign than traditional theory would have it, but that, if anything, 
suggests less need for governmental regulation of speech, not more.”212
Grants of benefits should be allowed.213  Bargaining orders should be 
rare, as the election result, even if tainted, is likely to reflect the wishes of 
employees.214  However, the authors do depart from this “hands-off” 
model in several instances.  Even the authors cannot fully ascribe to their 
findings that severe employer illegality has little effect on campaigns.  
They recommend harsher penalties, such as treble damages, for illegal 
discharges during the campaign.215  And they argue in favor of equal 
opportunities for unions and employers to address the workers during 
work time on employer premises.  Noting the employer’s significant 
advantage in communicating with employees, the authors argue that “an 
employer who holds campaign meetings on working time and premises 
should be required to allow the union (or unions) to hold such metings 
on working time and premises.”216  Comparing the election again to the 
political process, the authors state: “It is fundamental to the democratic 
210 Id. at 143.
211 Id. at 150.
212 Id. at 150.
213 Id. at 151.
214 Id. at 153-56.
215 Id. at 155-56.
216 Id. at 157.
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process that each party should have a roughly equal opportunity to 
communicate with the electorate, regardless of the effectiveness of that 
communication.”217  The authors similarly praise the Board’s Exclesior
requirements for their facilitation of access.218
Getman, Goldberg, and Herman’s study was primarily criticized for 
its failure to blame employer coercion for the decreasing rate of private-
employee unionization.219  As commentators pointed out, many of the 
statistics heralded by the authors as proof of campaign irrelevance could 
be read much more ambiguously.220  In fact, according to one reading of 
the study’s data, the study shows that unions would have won 46% to 
47% of elections if they had been entirely free from illegal behavior, and 
3% to 10% if the employers had campaigned at the highest level of 
illegality shown in the study.221  However, as will be discussed below, 
these critics do not generally quarrel with the study’s efforts to minimize 
the length or importance of the campaign.  Although the Board initially 
relied on the study in changing its misrepresentation jurisprudence in 
Shopping Kart, the Board later rejected these findings when it reversed 
course in General Knit.222  When the Board subsequently changed back to 
the Shopping Kart rule, it failed to cite the study as grounds for doing 
so.223  Recent efforts to use the study before the Board have not met with 
success.224
217 Id.
218 Id. at 159 n.39.
219 See, e.g., Patricia Eames, An Analysis of the Union Voting Study from a Trade-
Unionist’s Point of View, 28 STAN. L. REV. 1181, 1182 (1976); Weiler, supra note PW1, 
at 1782.
220
 Eames, supra note PE1, at 1183-87; Weiler, supra note PW1, at 1782-86.
221
 Weiler, supra note PW1, at 1786.  In making this assertion, Weiler relied on an 
unpublished Ph.D. dissertation by William Dickens.  See id. (citing William Dickens, 
Union Representation Elections: Campaign and Vote (1980)).  Dickens’ dissertation was 
published in edited form as William Dickens, The Effects of Company Campaigns on 
Certification Elections: Law and Reality Once Again, 36 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 560 
(1983).  Getman and Goldberg, along with a new co-author, responded to Weiler’s 
article as well as the Dickens’ analysis in Stephen B. Goldberg, Julius G. Getman & 
Jeanne M. Brett, The Relationship between Free Choice and Labor Board Doctrine: 
Differing Empirical Approaches, 79 NW. U. L. REV. 721 (1984).
222See General Knit, 239 NLRB at 621-22.
223 See generally Midland Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 263 NLRB 127 (1982).
224 See Overnite Transp. Co., 323 NLRB 990, 1999 WL 1036568 at *50 n.34 (noting that 
respondent’s reliance on the study was “undermined” by the Board’s decision in 
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B. The Problem of Employer Coercion: Paul Weiler and Craig Becker
Paul Weiler came to Harvard Law School in 1981 after extensive 
experience with the Canadian system of labor relations.225  In a 
groundbreaking series of articles, Weiler argued for a new framework for 
U.S. labor law, based primarily on the Canadian model.226  In his first 
article, Weiler developed an alternative model for the certification of 
unions as collective employee representatives.227
Weiler’s central premise was that the steady decline in union 
representation results (at least in substantial part) from a marked increase 
in employer coercion and illegal tactics directed at union campaigns and 
supporters.  To prove this point, Weiler relied on statistics about two 
general trends.  First, Weiler noted that the rate of union victories in 
representation campaigns dropped from 74% in 1950 to 48% in 1980.228
At the same time, the number of unfair labor practice claims filed against 
employers rose from 4,472 in 1950 to 31,281 in 1980, with the percentage 
of meritorious claims rising slightly.229  Putting these two trends together, 
Weiler argued that the decrease in union representation is correlated with 
the increase in employer unfair labor practices.  For further proof, Weiler 
compared the U.S. data with Canadian data, which had roughly three 
times the rate of increasing union density from new union certifications, 
as well as one-sixth the number of discriminatory discharge complaints 
per election.230
Weiler blamed the increasing influence of employer coercion for the 
declining rates of U.S. unionization.  According to Weiler, weak remedies 
for unfair labor practices, combined with lengthy delays in the 
General Knit), overruled in part on different grounds by Overnite Transp. Co. v. NLRB, 
280 F.3d 417 (4th Cir. 2002).
225
 Weiler served as Chairman of the Labour Relations Board of British Columbia from 
1974 to 1978 and helped author sections of British Columbia’s labor provisions.  Weiler, 




 Weiler, supra note PW1.
228
 Weiler, supra note PW1, at 1776.
229 Id. at 1780.
230 Id. at 1817.  In 1980, the annual increase in union density produced by newly 
certified units was 0.24% in the United States, compared with 0.72% in Ontario and 
0.84% in British Columbia.  The ratio of discriminatory discharges to per representation 
campaign was 2.5 in the United States, but only 0.4 in Ontario and 0.1 in British 
Columbia.  Id.  
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representation and remediation process, encouraged an atmosphere of 
employer coercion and lawbreaking.  In order to stem the tide of this 
illegal campaigning, Weiler argued not for greater penalties, but instead 
for the elimination of the campaign process itself.  Instead of a two-month 
campaign between initial filing and actual election, Weiler advocated for 
an “instant” (five days or less) election.231  Such a brief period would 
prevent employers from sustaining prolonged campaign offenses replete 
with unfair labor practices and other tactics of intimidation.232
Weiler acknowledged that the purpose of a union representation 
system is “to nurture and protect employee freedom of choice with 
respect to collective bargaining.”233  However, Weiler argued that the 
U.S. model overplays the significance of the union to employees by 
treating the union as “a quasi-governmental authority over the 
employees.”234  By allowing the employer to participation in the 
campaign during a substantial period of time, the NLRA had in effect 
stated that “the employer is legitimately entitled to play the same role in a
representation campaign against the union that the Republican Party plays 
in a political campaign against the Democrats.”235  As Weiler argued, this 
is strange – the union is seeking to represent employees in their 
relationship with the employer, in a context in which employees and 
employers often have adverse interests.236  A more apt analogy, according 
to Weiler, would be allowing foreign governments to have a role in our 
political campaigns.237  If anything, this is too weak; perhaps a better 
analogy would be allowing your spouse to have a say in who you hire as 
your divorce attorney.
Weiler did recognize “one final defense” for proponents of the current 
system: namely, the election campaign as “an aid to informed employee 
choice.”238  The employer serves as a proxy supporter for those 
employees who do not support the union and provides them with 
resources, arguments, and organization.239  Weiler was not persuaded, 
231
 Weiler, supra note PW1, at 1770, 1820-22.
232 Id. at 1812.
233 Id. at 1808.
234 Id. at 1809.
235 Id. at 1813.
236 Id. at 1813.
237 Id. at 1814.
238 Id. at 1815.
239 Id.
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however, based on his analysis of the costs and benefits to such a system.  
He believed that the employer had a fair opportunity to make its case 
prior to the representation election; that U.S. workers were not 
unsophisticated about unions; and that employers would have a chance to 
make their case about working conditions during negotiations with the 
union.240  Weiler concluded: “The contribution made by the election 
campaign to the enlightenment of the employees is marginal at best.”241
In 1993, Craig Becker built upon Weiler’s criticism of the political 
model for union representation campaigns.  According to Becker, the 
conception of the union election as a contest between employer and 
unions had “subverted labor’s right to representation.”242  Employers 
were not competing against unions in a neutral election, but rather 
attempting to influence an election in an arena where they help ultimate 
power.243  Delving into Wagner Act legislative history as well as early 
Board decisions, Becker developed how the democratic political 
campaign had become the “legitimating metaphor” for the Wagner Act 
and collective bargaining more generally.244  However, early Board 
decisions had not required a secret-ballot election in determining 
representation and, more importantly, had held that the employer had no 
role to play in the campaign process.245  It was not until the Supreme 
Court and the Taft-Hartley Act intervened that the Board was required to 
have secret-ballot elections and provide the employer with the right to 
present its case, as long as it made no threats or bribes.246
Once the electoral model was imposed on the representation 
campaign, the Board’s regulation of the process vacillated between a 
laissez-faire political model and the much stricter laboratory conditions 
model.247  The laboratory conditions model is thus seen as a response to 
the employer’s new role: in order to restrain the effects of employer 
participation, the Board needed to lay down strict requirements on 
electioneering.  The contradiction between laboratory conditions and 
240 Id. at 1815-16.
241 Id. at 1816.
242
 Becker, supra note CB1, at 497.
243 Id. at 523-47.
244 Id. at 501-23.
245 Id. at 535-40 (discussing American Tube Bending Co., 44 N.L.R.B. 121 (1942), 
enforcement denied, 134 F.2d 993 (2d Cir.)).
246
 29 U.S.C. §§ 128(c), 129; Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1945).
247
 Becker, supra note CB1, at 547-48.
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political democracy, however, is manifest.  Commentators have criticized 
Board regulations based on the dissonance between these concepts.248
But as Becker pointed out, the political analogy itself is inapt.  The 
answer, according to Becker, is not to embrace the freewheeling 
regulation of the political model, as suggested by Bok and Getman et al., 
but rather to get rid of the political analogy and its trappings.249  Becker’s 
prescription is to strip employers of “any legally cognizable interest in 
their employees’ election of representatives.”250
What exactly would this mean?  Becker did not propose that 
employers must remain neutral during representation campaigns.  Instead, 
he argued that employers should not have any official role in the election 
process.  Thus, employers would have no grounds to contest the unit or 
otherwise participate in representation hearings.251  Employers would not 
have the right to challenge elections or voters, and thus would not have 
the right to place observers at the polls.252  More generally, campaign 
rules would attempt to prevent employers from “exploiting their singular 
economic power to persuade employees.”253  Thus, employers would not 
be permitted to host any “captive audience” campaign presentations.254
They would be bound to follow the rules on solicitation and distribution 
that they laid down for union representatives.255  Although Becker’s 
proposal thus seems to allow for employer speech as long as similar 
opportunities are offered to the union, he did state that “[i]t is but a short 
step to the realization that all employer speech to employees during 
working hours, at the workplace, is speech to a captive audience.”256
Becker’s rhetoric is firmly set against any participation by the 
employer in representation campaigns.  But his proposed solution allows 
employers to continue to have a role in the election process, albeit a non-
legally-sanctioned one.  It is not clear why, if employers have no 
legitimate interests in the process, Becker was not willing to return to the 
Board’s prior employer-neutrality requirement.  Perhaps his proposal is 
248 GETMAN ET AL., supra note JG1, at 157; Bok, supra note DB1, at 68.
249
 Becker, supra note CB1, at 577-85.
250 Id. at 500.
251 Id. at 586-87.
252 Id. at 586.
253 Id. at 592.
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255 Id.
256 Id. at 600.
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based primarily on practical considerations, since he emphasized that it 
could be achieved “with almost no alteration of the statutory 
framework.”257  But it seems unrealistic to expect that employers will 
have a substantially reduced role in the campaign merely because they 
can no longer officially intervene.
I believe that Becker may have been hung up by the same concerns 
that befuddled Bok as well as Getman.  While acknowledging the 
disfunctionality of the election process, these commentators seem 
reluctant to completely eliminate the representation campaign.  Even 
though Becker persuasively deconstructed the political electioneering 
model as applied in this context, he could not quite argue for a wholesale 
elimination of it.  Perhaps Becker was merely working within what he felt 
were the politically realistic constraints at the time.  But Becker’s reforms 
recognize, despite his rhetoric, that the employer may in fact have a 
continuing role to play within the campaign.  It is hard to reconcile this 
continuing role based on the powerful problems, as he and Paul Weiler 
set forth, caused by  continued engagement.
C. Past Reforms and the Problem of the Rational Actor
As discussed above, there have been two distinct reformist 
approaches to the union representation election.  The Bok-Getman
approach believes that the NLRB has swamped the process with a flood 
of complicated regulations.  Believing that most employees have already 
made up their minds, they place little stock in the pre-election campaign.  
Although they acknowledge that employer coercion may have ill effects 
on pro-union sentiment, they argue that overall the effects are not that 
important.  Their reforms focus on cutting down the red tape that 
entangles the post-election process, in order to secure election results 
more quickly and enable participants to settle in to the post-election 
reality.  The Weiler-Becker approach, on the other hand, believes that the 
effects of employer coercion and disapproval during the election 
campaign are incredibly important.  They argue that employer 
participation in representation campaigns allows employers to cow their 
employees through legal and illegal means.  By using coercion, threats, 
and even simple disapproval, employers can significantly reduce 
employee support and enthusiasm for union representation, resulting in 
257 Id. at 585.
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fizzled campaigns and lost elections.  Weiler and Becker both 
acknowledge a role for the representation campaign, but they believe that 
employers’ roles in those campaigns should be greatly reduced or even 
eliminated.
Both camps would find some grounds for agreement with each other.  
Weiler and Becker would surely agree that the potentially lengthy post-
election process, where employers can delay a union victory by raising 
and litigation objections and challenges, should be shortened.  And Bok 
and Getman et al. acknowledge that employer coercion can improperly 
interfere with the election process.  But I think they also are both missing 
perhaps the most important issue in a representation campaign – namely, 
whether union representation is an economically rational choice for the 
employees making the selection.  The Bok-Getman approach places little 
emphasis on this question, believing that employees will either base their 
decisions on irrational whims, hunches, or prejudices258 and/or are 
programmed well before a particular campaign to either accept or reject 
the union’s offer.259  They thus discount the usefulness of the 
representation campaign in providing information to employees about the 
costs and benefits of unionization.  Weiler and Becker, on the other hand, 
seem to believe that employees have all of the information they need once 
they have signed authorization cards.  They discount the negative 
information about the union that employers may provide, and instead 
believe that employees have gotten all of the information they need to 
know before the campaign.  However, they spend little time analyzing 
this process, and I suspect that they believe unionization would be in the 
interests of almost any employee out there.
As will be discussed further below, I agree that reforms should limit 
the delays caused by post-election challenges, and should try to curtail the 
effects of employee coercion.  However, I also believe that the two 
approaches discussed above have overlooked the role of the campaign in 
providing critical information to employees about the costs and benefits 
of the unionization decision.  Providing this information is the real 
purpose of the representation campaign and election, and the two prior 
reformist programs have paid little attention to this purpose.  In the 
section that follows, I will discuss how Congress and the Securities and 
Exchange Commission have taken a very different approach to managing 
258
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information in the context of the securities markets.  In that context, 
regulation has been almost entirely focused on providing the right 
information to potential consumers.  From that discussion, I then will 
endeavor to show why steps towards information disclosure in the market 
for labor representation have an even stronger normative basis.
PART III: THE CASE FOR REQUIRED DISCLOSURE IN THE UNION 
REPRESENTATION CAMPAIGN 
A.  Information and Rational Contracting
Rational decisions to exchange goods or services – in other words, 
trade – are the key mechanisms to improving our individual and societal 
welfare.260  Contracts are the legal mechanism for enforcing trades in our 
economic system.  According to economic theory, contracts should be 
enforced because of their Pareto optimality: they increase the utility of all 
of the parties to the exchange.261  Of course, there can be contractual 
winners and losers; many contracts are about hedging risk, and one party 
ends up bearing the risk.  But when the contract is created, both parties 
agree to it (per economic doctrine) because they believe it increases their 
net present utility.
However, for contractual exchanges to be Pareto optimal, they 
must be made using the proper data, or “perfect information” in economic 
parlance.262  If the data is faulty, the results will be faulty, no matter how 
260
 The stereotypical beginning to every microeconomics course is the discussion of 
utility involving two people each with a large supply of one good.  One may have peanut 
butter, for example, and the other grape jam.  The professor demonstrates how each 
party will be better off if they trade some of their good for some of the other party’s 
good.  For example, if Jack has ten jars of peanut butter and trades three of his jars for 
three jars of Jane’s jam, both will be better off – their utility will increase.
261 See Eric A. Posner, Contract Law in the Welfare State: A Defense of the 
Unconscionability Doctrine, Usury Laws, and Related Limitations on the Freedom to 
Contract, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 283, 284 (1995) ("In the area of contract law, the 
efficiency argument concludes that courts should enforce all voluntary contracts that do 
not produce negative externalities, regardless of their distributive consequences. If a 
contract is voluntary, then it presumptively improves the well-being of both parties.").
262 See Christopher L. Peterson, Truth, Understanding, and High-Cost Consumer Credit: 
The Historical Context of the Truth in Lending Act, 55 FLA. L. REV. 807, 881 (2003) 
(“Without accurate information about the quality and especially the price of any good, 
no person can minimize their opportunity costs, since they cannot compare the value of 
that product to their next best option. Thus, in a policymaking system of private 
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logical the decisionmaker.263 To what extent do we simply trust parties to 
gather information for themselves?  Given its importance to the 
bargaining context, information material to the transaction must at a 
minimum be protected from false or deceptive misinformation.  In some 
cases, however, the parties – either individually or together – will be 
unable to generate the necessary levels of information.
The common law of contract has long struggled with how to manage 
information in the bargaining process.  From the beginning courts have 
prohibited fraud – i.e., misrepresentations about information material to 
the contract.  However, the definition of “fraud” has long extended to 
omissions in disclosure as well as affirmative misrepresentations, as the 
famous case of Laidlaw v. Organ264 attests.  Many scholars have 
attempted to provide a theoretical basis for determining when parties to a 
contract negotiation have a duty to disclose material information.265
Although one might say that, in the absence of a fiduciary relationship, 
there is no common law requirement to disclose, this is an 
overstatement.266  In fact, in a number of instances, courts have required 
parties to disclose information, or they will risk rescission or even 
liability for fraud.267
To a large extent, however, the common law of contractual disclosure 
has been superseded by a variety of statutory schemes that endeavor to 
regulate information in the context of particular markets.  Consumer 
protection laws focus in part on providing information about critical 
decisionmaking, where individuals act without accurate cost information, there is no 
policymaking at all, rather just the random and often tragic outcomes of market 
anarchy.”).
263
 Or, as the saying goes, “garbage in, garbage out.”  See Webopedia, garbage in, 
garbage out, available at: 
http://www.webopedia.com/TERM/g/garbage_in_garbage_out.html.
264
 15 U.S. 178 (1817).  At issue in Laidlaw was a contract for the sale of tobacco made 
at the close of the War of 1812.  The buyer knew that the war had ended and, with that, 
the British blockade that had reduced the value of tobacco.  The Supreme Court ruled 
that while there was no requirement for the buyer to disclose the information, he had a 
duty to disclose the information if asked directly about it by the seller.  Id. at 194.  
265
 Kimberly D. Krawiec & Kathryn Zeiler, Common Law Disclsoure Duties and the Sin 
of Omission: Testing the Meta-theories 91 VA. L. REV. 1795, 1796 (2005) (noting that 
“[d]ozens of law reviews” have dealt with this “hotly debated question[]”).
266 Id.
267 See RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS (SECOND) § 161 (listing four general exceptions).
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aspects of the product.268  The Food & Drug Administration requires 
extensive labeling on prepackaged food products in order to inform the 
public about ingredients, calories, and fat content.269  The Truth in 
Lending Act requires the disclosure of interest rates in understandable 
terms. 270  The primary purpose of these statutes is to empower the 
consumer to make efficient decisions by having the proper information.271
Perhaps the most comprehensive scheme of contractual regulation is 
the federal system of securities regulation.  Even before the New Deal, 
state blue sky laws placed special restrictions on the sale of securities 
beyond the common law.272  The Securities Act of 1933273 and the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934274 then completely reshaped the playing 
field.  They put into place a comprehensive federal system premised on 
antifraud protection and a process of mandatory disclosure.  This scheme, 
while fleshed out though seventy years of amendment, regulation, and 
judicial opinion, retains relatively the same structure with which it began.
268
 For example, the federal Moss-Magnuson Warranty Act requires disclosure about 
warranties on consumer products.  See Joan Vogel, Squeezing Consumers: Lemon Laws, 
Consumer Warranties, and a Proposal for Reform, 1985 ARIZ. ST. L. J. 589, 610 (“The 
basic goal of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act is to improve the warranty information 
available to consumers by providing for full disclosure of all written warranty terms in a 
clear and concise manner.”).
269 See 21 U.S.C. §§ 371(a), 393(b)(2)(A) (2000); 21 C.F.R. § 101.9 (2005); U.S. Food 
and Drug Administration, What FDA Regulates, at 
http://www.fda.gov/comments/regs.html (last visited Sept. 26, 2005).  For discussion of 
a particular change in the regulations, see Food & Drug Admin., Food Labeling: Trans
Fatty Acids in Nutrition Labeling, Nutrient Content Claims, and Health Claims, 68 Fed. 
Reg. 41434 (July 11, 2003).
270 Peterson, supra note CP1, at 880 (“The most important requirements of the Truth in 
Lending provisions centered around the disclosure of the cost of credit based on standard 
uniform requirements set out by the act and by the Federal Reserve Board.”). See also
Matthew A. Edwards, Empirical and Behavioral Critiques of Mandatory Disclosure: 
Socio-Economics and the Quest for Truth in Lending, 14 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y
199 (2005).
271 See, e.g., Peterson, supra note CP1, at 883 (“Unlike interest rate caps and other 
control devices, disclosure regulation – at least in theory – increases the freedom of 
consumers through giving the opportunity to open one's own eyes. With a uniform 
method of learning the costs and characteristics of credit contracts, debtors can 
determine which credit contracts are in their best interests.”).
272 See Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Origin of the Blue Sky Laws, 70 TEX. 
L. REV. 347, 348 (1991).
273
 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a – 77aa (2000).
274
 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a – 78mm (2000).
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The disclosure requirements mandated by federal regulation are 
considerably broad.  In the context of an initial offering, § 5 of the 1993 
Act requires that issuers file a comprehensive registration statement with 
the Securities and Exchange Commission.275  Section 7 of the 1933 Act, 
along with Schedule A, sets forth the basics of the disclosure 
requirements and also empowers the Commission to establish further 
disclosure regulations.276  Schedule A sets forth thirty-two separate 
provisions of disclosure, including the issuer’s articles of incorporation or 
other structural documents,277 the general character of the issuer’s 
business,278 the amount of outstanding debt,279 remuneration paid to 
directors and officers,280 the security’s price (or method of calculating the 
price),281 items relating to possible conflicts of interest,282 a detailed 
balance sheet,283 and a profit and loss statement.284  The Commission has 
further refined these requirements through a series of forms and further 
regulations.  The Commission’s forms break down what information must 
merely be disclosed to the Commission and what information must also 
be provided in the prospectus, a document provided to potential 
purchasers.285  However, these forms generally refer to Regulation S-K to 
define what exactly must be provided.  Regulation S-K is significantly 
more detailed than Schedule A, detailing precisely what types of 
quantitative and qualitative information must be disclosed.286  For 
example, Regulation S-K has extremely detailed requirements on the 
disclosure of financial information,287 including a special provision on 
275
 15 U.S.C. § 77e (2000).
276
 15 U.S.C. §§ 77g, 77aa (2000).
277
 15 U.S.C § 77aa(31) (2000).
278 Id. § 77aa(8).
279 Id. § 77aa(12).
280 Id. § 77aa(14).
281 Id. § 77aa(16).
282 See id. §§ 77aa(17) (commissions paid to underwriters); 77aa(20) (amounts paid to 
promoters); 77aa(22) (recent issuer purchases of property held by directors or substantial 
stockholders).
283 Id. § 77aa(25).
284 Id. § 77aa(26).
285 See, e.g., Form S-1, 2 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) P7121, at 6237 (Oct. 22, 2001).
286
 Regulation S-K, 17 C.F.R. §§ 229.10-229.702 (2005).
287 See id. §§ 229.301-229.304.
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management’s discussion and analysis of the firm’s financial condition 
and results of its operations.288
In the context of a securities offering, federal law integrates the 
required disclosure within an overall process of restrictions on 
information dissemination.  Section 5(c) of the 1933 Act prohibits all 
offers to sell the securities prior to the filing of the registration 
statement.289  However, the Commission has given an extremely broad 
definition to the term “offer,” holding that any communication reasonably 
calculated to generate a buying interest is an offer.290  After the 
registration materials have been filed, the issue enters the “waiting 
period” until the Commission has made the registration statement 
effective.  Offers to sell made during the waiting period must generally 
also provide all of the information required in the prospectus.291  Since 
some of this information may not be available until the offering price has 
been set, it may be impossible to furnish the required prospectus during 
the waiting period.292  The Commission thus has made a limited 
exception to this Catch-22 by allowing “tombstone ads”293 and 
preliminary “red herring” prospectuses.294  Once the waiting period has 
ended, all written offers for sale must be accompanied by a complete 
prospectus.295
Although quite complicated, the registration process is designed to 
accomplish three primary purposes: (1) make material information about 
the issuer public, (2) require the issuer to deliver some of that information 
to potential investors (through the prospectus), and (3) restrict the issuer’s 
opportunities to promote its securities outside of these channels.  It does 
not seem a stretch to say that the 1933 Act, and by extension the 
Commission, are endeavoring to create “laboratory conditions” for the 
288 See id. § 229.303.
289
 15 U.S.C. § 77e(c) (2000).
290
 Carl M. Loeb, Rhoades & Co., 38 S.E.C. 843 (1959).  See also JAMES D. COX & 
THOMAS L. HAZEN, CORPORATIONS 723 (2d ed. 2003).  There are some exceptions to 
this prohibition.  See SEC Rules 137-139, 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.137-139 (2005).
291 See 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(10) (2000) (defining any written as a prospectus); id. § 
77e(b)(1) (requiring all prospectuses to contain certain information once the registration 
statement has been filed).
292 COX & HAZEN, supra note CH1, at 724.
293 See 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(10) (2000); 17 C.F.R. § 230.134 (2005).
294
 17 C.F.R. § 230.430 (2005).
295 See 15 U.S.C. § 77e(b) (2000).
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sales of securities.  They are trying to get material information to the 
consumer, and at the same time they are limiting opportunities for 
purchase without such information.
In contrast to the 1933 Act’s focus on a security’s initial sale, the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 regulates the sales of securities after 
they have been issued and are traded on the open market.  The 1934 Act 
establishes a registration and supervision system for national securities 
exchanges296 and requires continuing disclosure for companies whose 
securities trade on those markets.297  The mandatory disclosure comes in 
the form of periodic reports: Form 10-K, an annual report; Form 10-Q, a 
quarterly report, and Form 8-K, an interim report required in limited 
circumstances.298  The 1934 Act also regulates brokers, members, and 
dealers of the exchanges,299 and imposes certain requirements with 
respect to proxy solicitations and tender offers.300  The SEC also enacted 
Rule 10b-5, its comprehensive antifraud provision, under § 10 of the 1934 
Act.
A survey of every context in which contractual disclosure is required 
is beyond the scope of this article.301  What follows instead is an 
argument for mandatory disclosure in the union representation context.  
More specifics about the content and extent of this disclosure will be 
discussed in Part VII.  In this Part, I will discuss more generally the 
information failures in the market for union representation that would 
296
 15 U.S.C. § 78f (2000).
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 15 U.S.C. § 78m (2000).
298
 Jeanne L. Schroeder, Envy and Outsider Trading: The Case of Martha Stewart, 26 
CARDOZO L. REV. 2023, 2048 (2005).
299
 15 U.S.C. §§ 78k, 78o(c) (2000).
300
 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m, 78n (2000).
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 Because of its relation to the employment contract, a brief discussion of the ERISA 
system of disclosure may be instructive.  ERISA has a very specific statutory framework 
for disclosure.  See 29 U.S.C §§ 1021-1031.  Employers with covered plans must file 
information with the Department of Labor, the PBGC, the IRS, and plan participants.  
An example of one such disclosure requirement is the Summary Plan Description, which 
must be furnished to plan participants and “shall be written in a manner calculated to be 
understood by the average plan participant.”  29 U.S.C. § 1022(a).  The type of 
information required in the Description includes the name and type of administration of 
the plan, the name and addresses of administrators and trustees, and the procedures to be 
followed in seeking benefits under the plan.  See 29 U.S.C. § 1022(b).  In addition, 
ERISA requires annual reports, id. § 1023, plan descriptions, and notice of modification 
to the plans.  Id. § 1021.  These reports are generally made public.  Id. § 1026.  
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require mandated disclosure.  In so doing, I will rely heavily on 
discussions about required disclosure in the securities markets, based on 
the comprehensiveness of that scheme and the deep theoretical literature 
surrounding it.
B. Arguments for Required Disclosure in the Union Representation 
Campaign
1. Union representation and the problem of information asymmetry.
As noted above, the basic common law contractual paradigm assumes 
that parties to a contract will obtain their own information.  Although the 
common law prohibits fraud and requires truthful disclosure in response 
to questioning, there is no general duty to disclose information.  The set 
of cases that usually come to mind are those involving some hidden cost 
or benefit that has been discovered, at some cost, by one of the parties.  
Requiring disclosure of this information will dampen the incentive to find 
this information in the first place, and thus society will have less 
information and will be worse off.302
Moreover, in most cases the market will provide incentives for 
participants to disclose information voluntarily.  Consumers will not buy 
a product unless they know something about it.  If a seller fails to disclose 
sufficient information, consumers will demand the information; those 
sellers that provide it will sell more products.  We need information to get 
us interested in contracting in the first place.  Of course, advertising is to 
some extent hype and persuasion, but it is also information.  Sellers have 
an incentive to provide enough information so that buyers can identify 
their product and judge for themselves whether they want the product and 
at what cost.
Of course, it may be possible for a market to fail to provide such 
information on its own.  For reasons discussed further below, the market 
participants have incentives to reveal insufficient information about the 
product, thus leading eventually to a failure of the market.  One of the 
most famous examples of such a situation is the market for used cars as 
modeled by George Akerlof in The Market for “Lemons”. 303  As 
described by Akerlof, the sellers of used cars have much more 
information about the true quality of the car than do sellers.  Moreover, it 
302 RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 111 (6th ed. 2003).
303
 George A. Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the Market 
Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488 (1970).
INFORMATION & REPRESENTATION ELECTIONS
52
is difficult to correct this information asymmetry, given the inability of 
most buyers to determine quality or to trust a seller’s purported 
information disclosure.  Under Akelof’s model, buyers will be forced to 
assume that a used car is a “lemon” and thus will only offer to pay the 
value of a lemon, regardless of the car’s actual quality.  Those with 
quality used cars will thus elect to keep their cars rather than sell them at 
a drastically reduced value, leaving only those with actual lemons in the 
market.  Akerlof thus predicts that a downward spiral may result, in 
which “it is quite possible to have the bad driving out the not-so-bad 
driving out the medium driving out the no-so-good driving out the good 
in such a sequence of events that no market exists at all.”304
The “market for lemons” problem is not confined to used cars.  As 
Bernard Black has pointed out, securities markets are a “vivid example” 
of Akerlof’s market for lemons; “[i]ndeed, they are a far more vivid 
example than [the] original example of used cars.”305  Black explains:
Used car buyers can observe the car, take a test drive, have 
a mechanic inspect the car, and ask others about their 
experiences with the same car model or manufacturer.  By 
comparison, a company’s shares, when the company first 
goes public, are like an unobservable car, produced by an 
unknown manufacturer, on which investors can obtain only 
dry, written information that they can’t directly verify.306
If investors cannot verify the information they receive about a security, 
the market is ripe for exploitation.  Knowing this, investors will treat 
every security as if they cannot trust the underlying facts about it.  This 
underpricing will drive the higher quality issuers out of the market, 
leading to Akerlof’s downward spiral which completely destroys the 
market.
Why is information so crucial to the securities markets?  A security, 
particularly corporate shares, represents a property right in something that 
exists only as a fictional person, created through documents filed in a 
particular state.  Shareholders generally do not run the business; they 
304 Id. at 490.
305
 Bernard S. Black, The Legal and Institutional Preconditions for Strong Securities 
Markets, 48 UCLA L. REV. 781, 786 (2001).
306 Id.
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contribute capital so that others may run a profitable business and pay the 
shareholders the residual.  A shareholder trusts the people who run the 
corporation – officers and directors – to act as their representatives in 
running the corporation so as to maximize shareholder value.307
Although shareholders elect the board of directors, who in turn appoint 
the officers who run the corporation, this power is very difficult to 
exercise in a large corporation.  Thus, shareholders must be able to trust 
directors and officers to use their money appropriately.  There is a very 
real “agency costs” concern that lies at the heart of much corporate law 
today.308
Are unions subject to the “market for lemons” problem?  Upon 
examination, they are subject to agency cost concerns similar to those of 
corporate shareholders.  Union members trust that their union dues will 
be used by union officials to get them the best terms and conditions of 
employment possible.  And similar to shareholders, union members have 
the right to elect these officials, although that power is similarly 
attenuated, especially at the national level.309
Union representation services also have the more general information 
asymmetries that contribute to a “market for lemons.”  Unions provide 
services that are not transparent; they are not easy to judge before 
purchase.310  The union promises to improve the employees’ terms and 
conditions of employment.  How much better will the terms and 
conditions be?  Will the negotiations proceed easily, or must a painful 
strike be endured?  How effective will the union be in representing 
employees in grievance arbitrations?  Are union officials paid the 
appropriate amount, or are they overpaid?  Would they properly manage 
my retirement?  It is very difficult to know ahead of time what the union 
307
 Directors are not strictly agents of the corporation; they are in fact more akin to 
elected representatives.  See, e.g., Automatic Self-Cleansing Filter Syndicate Co., Ltd. v. 
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ordinary agents . . . .  [T]hey are trustees with the power of controlling the property . . . 
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308 Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial 
Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976).
309 Stewart J. Schwab, Union Raids, Union Democracy, and the Market for Union 
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dues will buy.311  In addition, union services cannot be trial-tested before 
purchasing them.  It takes a very costly and time consuming process and 
agreement by a majority of employees to purchase union representation 
services.  And as will be discussed below,312 once those services have 
been purchased, it is very difficult to get out of them.
The Getman, Goldberg, and Herman study indicated that many 
workers made their union election decisions based on previous 
experiences with union membership.313  But as the number of unionized 
private employees continues to decline, fewer workers have such 
experiences to draw on.  In voting for union representation, employees 
must make a leap of faith: that the money they pay to the union will be 
used to better their terms and conditions of employment, rather than 
leaving them the same or even making them worse.  Like the decision to 
buy a stock, the purchaser needs lots of information about the 
organization in order to determine whether the benefits of such a decision 
outweigh the costs.
But even if employees cannot easily get the necessary information by 
looking at the product or from past experience, won’t union and 
employers provide the necessary information themselves?  As discussed 
next, there are reasons to believe that the information will not be properly 
conveyed.
2.  The current market for union representation is poorly constructed to 
deliver information to potential customers.
The market for union representation services is constructed as an 
election.  Employees obtain representation services by voting for such 
services through a secret ballot election conducted by the Board.  As 
noted earlier,314 the pre-election process is often analogized to a political 
campaign in which the union and the employer are running against each 
other.  In a traditional political campaign, the parties to the election are 
311
 The problem applies even after employees have joined the union.  See id. at 379-80 
(“Union members have even greater difficulty monitoring and evaluating their leaders. 
Was the last wage increase a good one? Did the leaders work hard at the bargaining 
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312 See infra Part III.B.4.
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expected to generate all the necessary information for voters to make their 
decision.  Each candidate has an incentive to point out his or her positive 
features, as well as his or her opponent’s negative features.  Given these 
incentives, the voters can expect to get all positive and negative 
information about the candidates from the candidates’ pre-election 
campaigns.315
In a union representation campaign, the union is seeking, through an 
election, to represent a group of the employer’s workers.  The union thus 
has incentives to present itself in a positive light.  Like any seller of 
services, the union is trying to persuade its potential customers that they 
should purchase its services.316  Union representatives may use a variety 
of sales techniques that have been passed down through the centuries.  
But their incentives are to get employees to sign up with the union.  
In so doing, a union also has incentives to portray the employer in a 
negative light.  After all, the union’s services are simply group 
representation of employees in their negotiations with employers over the 
employment contract.  The union must therefore convince employees that 
the employer is not giving them the best terms and conditions that it 
could.  If a union cannot improve the employees’ lot, there is no need for 
its services.  So the union must convince employees that the union could 
negotiate on the employees’ behalf to get a better deal.  In making this 
case, the union may bring out information about the employer that may 
seem negative to employees.  For example, the union may argue that the 
employer’s profit margins are extremely high.  The union may argue that 
the employer is paying employees much less than other companies in the 
315
 Thus, much of the debate surrounding campaign reform has been whether parties 
have sufficient funds to get their message out.  Those in favor of campaign finance 
reforms generally believe that a combination of federal campaign funding and 
limitations on private donations are necessary to enable a level informational playing 
field. See, e.g., Dennis F. Thompson, Two Concepts of Corruption: Making Campaigns 
Safe for Democracy, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1036, 1047 (2005) (“[E]lectoral corruption 
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L.J. 1049, 1061 (1998) (arguing that any limitations on spending reduce 
communications).
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field pay their workers.  The crux of the case is that the employer is 
holding back, and the employees need the union to maximize their 
contractual benefits.
As Craig Becker has pointed out, the employer is in some respects a 
third party to this transaction.317  Whether I hire Jim to represent me in 
my negotiations with Earl is really no business of Earl’s.  But of course 
the employer often will have a strong interest in seeing the union’s 
election petition defeated.  Union representation may very well mean 
higher wages and better benefits for employees.  It means extensive 
bargaining sessions with the union over the contract.318  If the parties 
agree to a contract, the employer must inform the union of any future 
changes in working conditions and then bargain over those as well.319  If 
the parties do not agree to a contract, the employer may face a strike or 
unfair labor practice charges for failure to bargain in good faith.  For an 
employer looking to preserve the contractual status quo as well as its 
ability to act independently with regard to employees, such an employer 
has a very strong interest in seeing the union defeated.
In such cases the employer will have incentives to disseminate 
negative information about the union.  Of course, what is negative to the 
employer – i.e., the potential for higher wages – is not a negative for the 
employees.  So the employer will also have the incentive to find out and 
disseminate information about the union that is negative from an 
employee’s perspective.  For example, information about the union’s past 
ineffectiveness, its wastefulness of union funds, and its inability to live up 
to its campaign promises are all useful to the anti-union employer in 
dissuading employees from voting for the union.  The employer will also 
have incentives to paint itself in a positive light.  The employer will want 
to show that it is giving its employees the best deal it can, and that the 
union will not be able to get any further concessions from the employer.
However, the previous discussion assumes an employer that does not 
want union representation.  Although all employers have some incentives 
to avoid unionization, due to the added time and expense imposed by 
bargaining, employers who have the most incentive to defeat the union 
are those who have the most to lose from unionization.  And by 
317 See Becker, supra note CB1, at 498-500.
318
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extension, those employers will therefore put on the fiercest campaign.  
However, the employees of such employers arguably have the least need 
to get negative information about the union, since the union would be 
likely to help them.320
The converse is also true.  In those situations where the union is least 
likely to help employees – namely, where the union will not be all that 
effective in improving terms and conditions – the employer has the least 
incentive to wage a vigorous campaign.  These incentives are most 
skewed when the union has favorable relations with the employer.  
Obviously, an employer will not disseminate negative information about 
an employer-dominated union.  But such unions are illegal under the 
NLRA, and the Board would have the power to disempower such a union 
were employees to complain.321  However, other unions exist which are 
known to be more friendly to employers, and more apt to agree to 
favorable contracts, but their activities may not cross the line into illegal 
collusion.  The existence of so-called “sweetheart” unions is an 
understudied but undeniable part of the union landscape.322  Employers 
have no incentives to campaign against such unions.  In fact, an employer 
has strong incentives to court such unions, especially if there is a 
possibility of a good-faith union drive down the road.  As will be 
discussed below, with a sweetheart union an employer could lock its 
employees into a collective bargaining agreement for three years.  Thus, 
incentives for the employer to provide negative information about the 
union will be the lowest when structurally the need for such information 
will be the highest.
Of course, if more than one union is seeking to represent a group of 
employees, the unions will provide negative information about each 
other.  But such elections are comparatively rare.  In 2004, the NLRB 
handled 2,565 elections involving only one union, and 154 elections 
320
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involving more than one union.323  Much of this is a result of AFL-CIO 
guidelines restricting member unions from competing against each other.  
Under Article XX of the AFL-CIO Constitution, member unions are not 
permitted to organize or attempt to represent employees that are already 
represented by another AFL-CIO union.324  In addition, member unions 
cannot disseminate information as part of an organization campaign that 
may “adversely affect” the reputation of another member union.325  These 
restrictions provide AFL-CIO monopolies over certain groups of 
employees.  In so doing, they also restrict the information available to 
employees about the union.
Markets depend in large part on competition within the market to 
provide the necessary information about the quality of goods and 
services.  Advertising is often centered around a comparison between one 
product and another, attempting to show why the advertised product is 
superior.  In addition, sellers have incentives to provide information 
based on market pressure from other competitors.  If other firms are 
revealing information about their product that consumers find useful, 
even if that information is mixed, an individual firm will be punished by 
consumers if it does not provide comparable information.  If there is only 
one firm in the market, however, that firm will have much greater 
leverage in setting consumer expectations about the level of information 
disclosure.
Thus, the union representation election often provides improper 
incentives for the provision of material information to employees.  The 
union has incentive to provide positive information about itself and 
negative information about the employer.  The Board’s campaign model 
thus depends on the employer to provide positive information about itself 
and negative information about the union.  However, the employer’s 
incentives will be weakest in those situations where employees most need 
to receive negative information about the union – namely, when the union 
is looking for a sweetheart deal.  Given these incentives, employees may 
323
 National Labor Relations Board, Sixty-Ninth Annual Report 16 (2005), available at:
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not get information about a less-than-zealous union until it is too late –
namely, until after they have been locked into a three-year contract.326
3. The market for union representation does not have a vigorous role for 
reputational intermediaries.
One argument against mandatory disclosure in the context of the 
securities markets is cites to the protection provided to the market by 
“reputational intermediaries.” 327  Although mandatory disclosure critics 
recognize that firms may have inadequate incentives to disclosure 
information, they argue that the demand for information will create a 
market for that information.328  If sellers need to provide information in 
order to sell their product, they will provide the information; the market, 
through interactions between sellers and buyers, is best equipped to 
determine what information is necessary to disclose.329  While 
acknowledging that information about securities may be more difficult to 
verify, critics of mandatory disclosure argue that securities are not unique 
in this regard.  According to one set of commentators, the “lemons” 
argument proves too much, as it is also hard to verify claims about the 
efficacy of toothpaste or the pricing of funeral services.330  So without 
mandatory disclosure, the securities markets would not dry up; instead, 
326
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issuers would use the same tools as other sellers to market their wares to 
investors.331
How would this happen?   Issuers would voluntarily disclose all of the 
information that investors would need in order to buy the stock at a 
proper price.  If a company refused to disclose, investors would be 
justifiably wary, and the prices for their securities would drop 
precipitously.332  However, Akerlof’s “market for lemons” thesis assumes 
that the information about the product is hard to verify.  If there is no 
system in place for mandatory disclosure and governmental penalties for 
failing to do so, then investors may be concerned about the quality of the 
information they receive.  And Akerlof’s downward spiral could kick in. 
Rather than relying on the threat of government enforcement to assure the 
quality of information disclosed, issuers would have to find a private way 
to assure investors of information quality.333  This is where reputational 
intermediaries come in.  These market players would sell their reputations 
as honest, impartial, and savvy investigators to investors as a means of 
checking against issuer fraud.  Even with our system of mandatory 
disclosure, our securities market still places vital tasks in the hands of 
reputational intermediaries.  Accounting firms provide independent audits 
of the firm’s financial health.  Investment banks provide further 
verification by acting as underwriters and thus vouching for the security.  
Attorneys comb through the issuer’s disclosures to make sure they 
comply with the relevant law.  And research analysts pore over the 
disclosures and then report their impressions to clients, financial media 
outlets, and eventually the investing public.
There is no denying the importance of reputational intermediaries, or 
“gatekeepers,”334 to the proper functioning of the securities markets.  The 
failures of the 2001-2002 corporate scandals were often put at the feet of 
331 See Nicholas L. Georgakopoulos, Why Should Disclosure Rules Subsidize Informed 
Traders?, 16 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 417, 418-19 (1996) (using the Coase theorem to 
argue that investors will bargain for the appropriate level of fraud-prevention measures).
332 See id. at 683 (“If the firm simply asked for money without disclosing the project and 
managers involved, . . . it would get nothing.”).
333 See id. at 675 (discussing the use of “outsiders” to verify company financial 
information).
334 See John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding Enron: “It’s About the Gatekeepers, Stupid”, 
57 BUS. LAW. 1403, (2002) (defining gatekeeper in the securities regulation context as 
“reputational intermediaries who provide verification and certification services to 
investors”).
INFORMATION & REPRESENTATION ELECTIONS
61
reputational intermediaries,335  and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 
endeavors to shore up the ability of accountants and lawyers to serve as 
informational gatekeepers.336  However, much of the current “reputational 
intermediaries” system depends on the law to require or reinforce the 
provision of those services.  For example, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
imposed rigorous independence requirements on accountants and created 
a new independent oversight board to maintain accounting standards.337
The market did not require these of accountants prior to Sarbanes-Oxley, 
and yet they are perhaps the least controversial aspects of the new law.338
Attorneys generally act as intermediaries with respect to legal mandates, 
including disclosure requirements.  In the absence of those mandates, 
attorneys would only be responsible for insuring compliance with private 
contracts.  The stock exchanges are given special privileges and 
responsibilities by the SEC as self-regulating organizations.339  In his 
blueprint for a strong securities market, Black notes that such a market 
needs not only reputational intermediaries but also laws regulating these 
intermediaries.  For example, one of Black’s eighteen requirements340 for 
controlling informational asymmetry is “[a] sophisticated accounting 
profession, with the skill and experience to catch at least some instances 
of false or misleading disclosure.”341  However, Black also requires “laws 
that impose on accountants enough risk of liability to investors . . . so that 
the accountants will resist their clients’ pressure for laxer audits or more 
favorable disclosure.”342
335 See, e.g., FRANK PARTNOY, INFECTIOUS GREED: HOW DECEIT AND RISK CORRUPTED 
THE FINANCIAL MARKETS (2003); Coffee, supra note JCC1.
336
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338 But cf. Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack 
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Union financial disclosure is governed by the Labor-Management 
Reporting and Disclosure Act, also known as the Landrum-Griffin Act.343
The Department of Labor implements the LMRDA’s requirements 
through regulations;344 these regulations were recently modified to 
require a greater amount of disclosure.345  However, the new regulations 
have been criticized for not requiring unions to employ independent or 
outside auditors.346  By allowing unions to rely on their own employees to 
report sensitive financial data, the LMRDA’s regulations do not require 
the additional set of independent eyes to verify the veracity of that data.  
Although some large unions do use outside auditors in managing their 
finances, outside auditors are a general regulatory requirement for 
publicly-traded companies.347
Of course, LMRDA disclosure is designed for those who have already 
joined the union.  An employer may use the union’s disclosures for its 
own campaign purposes, often using the photocopy of the Department of 
Labor’s form to prove its veracity.348  But there is no requirement that 
employees receive what the union discloses to the LMRDA during the 
course of a union representation campaign.  They may not even know of 
superficial in its audits, or that a stock exchange fails to require the proper 
documentation for acceptance.  But just as there can be a “lemons” market for securities, 
there can be a “lemons” market for those who vouch for securities.  Investors cannot 
know precisely how well their reputational intermediaries are doing their jobs.  
However, slightly more forgiving accountants will be desirable to issuers, who will be 
looking for reputational intermediaries to put them in the best light.  Thus, market forces 
will drive accountants to be less strict, leading to less confidence from investors in their 
results.  As Black notes: “The result is ironic: The principal role of reputational 
intermediaries is to vouch for disclosure quality and thereby reduce information 
asymmetry in securities markets.  But information asymmetry in the market for 
reputational intermediaries limits their ability to play this role.”  Id. at 788.
343
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Requirements, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1734, 1734 (2004) [hereinafter Recent Regulation].
347 Id. at 1739.
348 See LOUIS JACKSON & ROBERT LEWIS, WINNING NLRB ELECTIONS: 
MANAGEMENTS’S STRATEGY AND PREVENTIVE PROGRAMS 18-19 (1972) (discussing 
how employers can use LMRDA disclosure in their campaign); ROGER S. KAPLAN & 
PHILIP B. ROSEN, RESPONDING TO UNION ORGANIZING CAMPAIGNS § 6.06 (2002) 
(same).
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its existence.  The NLRB is an independent agency, as distinct from the 
Department of Labor, which is an executive branch agency.349
Employees in the midst of a representation campaign may not know that 
there is information available that might be useful to their representation 
decision until after they are already in the organization.350
In addition, there is not the vibrant financial and consumer media that 
exists for other products and services.  According to Black, another 
critical institution for a vibrant securities market is “[a]n active financial 
press and securities analysis profession that can uncover and publicize 
misleading disclosure and criticize company insiders and (when 
appropriate) investment bankers, accountants, and lawyers.”351  As Black 
noted:
Reputation markets require a mechanism for distributing 
information about the performance of companies, insiders, 
and reputational intermediaries. Disclosure rules help, as do 
reputational intermediaries' incentives to advertise their 
successes. But intermediaries won't publicize their own 
failures, and investors will discount competitors' 
complaints because they come from a biased source. An 
active financial press is an important source of reporting of 
disclosure failures.352
The press does cover union failures and scandals, and such information is 
obviously relevant to the union representation decision.  However, there 
is not the same level of coverage or sophistication that is applied to 
information about the securities markets.  Nor is there the same sort of 
attention that is given to consumer products through such organizations as 
349
 For a discussion of the difference between independent agencies and executive 
branch agencies, see Linda R. Cohen & Matthew L. Spitzer, Judicial Deference to 
Agency Action: A Rational Choice Theory and an Empirical Test, 69 S. CAL. L. REV.
431, 445-51 (1996).
350
 In fact, the information is accessible on the Department of Labor’s website.  See 
Department of Labor, LMRDA Reporting and Public Disclosure, available at: 
http://www.dol.gov/esa/regs/compliance/olms/rrlo/lmrda.htm. 
351 See Black, supra note BB1, at 798.
352 Id.
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Consumer Reports.353  There is no “Consumer Reports for Unions.”  For 
a variety of reasons, it seems unlikely that reputational intermediaries 
such as “union analysts” will emerge any time soon.  As AFL-CIO unions 
do not compete against one another, employees looking for AFL-CIO 
representation only have one choice.  Unlike securities, union 
representation is not sold on a fungible national market.  Thus, there is 
not the money to be made on selling information about unions on a 
national scale.  Additionally, potential union members would not be in a 
position to pay significant sums for the kind of serious analysis that stock 
investors enjoy.  And if they were, they still might not choose to do so 
given the free-rider problems inherent in obtaining the information.  The 
information would benefit all potential employees at the firm.  In fact, the 
purchaser would have an incentive to share it, as the purchaser still needs 
a majority of employees to agree with her if she wishes to prevail on the 
representation question.  But while the benefits will accrue to all, it may 
not be possible to get all to agree to share in the costs.  Given the free-
rider concerns, information that would be efficient for all to obtain might 
not be efficient for only one to obtain.
In sum, the role of reputational intermediaries in supplying 
information to other markets is not replicated in the union representation 
market.  Their absence is yet another reason for concern about the 
information employees receive.
4. The market for union representation does not have an easy exit once 
consumers have made their purchase. 
A corporate shareholder traditionally has two options if unsatisfied 
with the direction of the company.  The shareholder can either vote for 
new directors or sell the shares to someone else.  The alienability of 
shares is a critical part of bundle of shareholder rights.354  Unlike 
partnerships, corporations allow investors to sell their interests in the firm 
without the need for unanimous approval or dissolution.355  And publicly-
353
 A search of the Consumer Reports website revealed no information about unions.  
See Consumer Reports Search Results for “Unions,” available at: 
http://www.consumerreports.org/cro/search.htm?query=unions.
354 See Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law, 
89 GEO. L.J. 439, 439-40 (2001) (noting that transferable shares are one of the five “core 
functional features” of the corporate form).
355 Compare Uniform Partnership Act § 29 (dissolution provision) with 8 Del. C. § .
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traded companies are treated quite differently than closely held 
corporations because of the ease of exit.  The ability to get out of the 
investment gives shareholders an escape hatch in case they become 
dissatisfied down the road.
In the market for union representation, the consequences of buying 
into the union are quite different. The most obvious difference is that the 
purchase of a stock gives the buyer something to resell, while a purchaser 
of services generally can only stop buying the services.  In that sense, exit 
may be easier for the purchaser of services, because there is no need to 
find someone else to buy it from you.  However, service contracts can 
have lengthy time periods, in which exit prior to the specified close can 
be quite expensive.
When a majority of employees vote in favor of a particular union 
during a representation election, they are choosing that union to represent 
them in collective bargaining.  Once selected, the union serves as that 
representative indefinitely.  In order to stop buying the union’s services, 
employees must vote in a decertification election.356  As in the 
representation election, a decertification election will only be conducted 
if the petitioner can show that at least thirty percent of the employees in 
the bargaining unit are in favor of such an election.357  The NLRB then 
conducts a secret ballot election and decertifies the union if supported by 
a majority of the votes.
The decertification process is not easy; it takes time to collect 
signatures for the petition, hold the actual election, and then resolve any 
disputes over pre-election conduct.  However, the statute also provides 
that no election can be held within a year after an election has been 
held.358  In the representation context, the Board has extended this ban 
until a year after it has actually certified the union as bargaining 
representative.359  The Board will consider any decertification petition 
filed within a year of certification to be untimely.360  Thus, the contract 
356
 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(1)(A)(ii) (2000).
357
 NLRB Rules and Regs. § 102.61.
358
 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(3) (2000).
359
 Brooks v. NLRB, 348 U.S. 96 (1954).
360 See Chelsea Indus., 331 NLRB 1648 (2000).
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for union services has at a de jure one-year minimum term from the 
start.361
If the union and the employer agree to a contract, the Board imposes 
an additional “contract bar” on potential decertification elections.  Under 
the contract-bar doctrine, employees are prohibited from filing a 
decertification petition during the life of a negotiated collective 
bargaining agreement.362  Thus, once the union and employer have agreed 
to terms, the employees must retain the union for the life of the contract.  
The contract bar lasts a maximum of three years, even if the agreement 
goes beyond that.363  However, the agreement need not be ratified by 
members in order to have preclusive effect, unless the agreement by its 
terms requires such approval.364
Of course, if the union and employer keep negotiating agreements, 
making sure to have a new contract before the other one expires, the 
employees would never have an opportunity to decertify the union.  Thus, 
the Board has created a thirty-day window in which decertification 
petitions may be filed.  The Board will consider a petition timely filed if it 
is filed no more than ninety days, but no less than sixty days, before the 
expiration of the agreement.365  The Board created the sixty-day cutoff in 
order to give the union a period of negotiation “free from the threat of 
overhanging rivalry and uncertainty.”366  Although there are some 
exceptions to the contract-bar doctrine, they generally involve an illegal 
clause in the contract367 or union incapacity through schism or 
defunctness.368
The one-year and contract-bar rules are most dangerous when there is 
collusion between the employer and the union.  Under such circumstances 
the employer and the union can agree to a contract and prevent the 
361
 Since it will take some time between the filing of the petition and the decertification 
election, the bar is actually longer than a year.  Employers are not allowed to withdraw 
recognition after a year based on a decertification petition presented to the employer 
before the year’s end.  Id.
362 See Cind-R-Lite Co., 239 NLRB 1255 (1979).
363
 General Cable Corp., 139 NLRB 1123 (1962).
364 See Stur-Dee Health Prods., 248 NLRB 1100 (1980); Appalachian Shale Prod. Co., 
121 NLRB 1160 (1958).
365 See Leonard Wholesale Meats Co., 136 NLRB 1000 (1962).
366
 Deluxe Metal Furniture Co., 121 NLRB 995, 1001 (1958) (quotations omitted).
367 See Hardin & Higgins, supra note HH1, at 527-29.
368 See id. at 535-38.
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employees from voting out the union for up to three years.369  However, 
even when a union is merely incompetent, employees may still be stuck 
with a poor bargaining representative for a lengthy period of time.
The Board does allow an alternative to decertification for removing a 
union from representation.  An employer may refuse to bargain with a 
union if the union has in fact lost the support of a majority of the 
employees.370  This standard replaced the old rule which permitted 
employers to cease negotiating based on a “good faith reasonable doubt” 
that the union had continuing majority support.371  Under the new 
standard, an employer may cease to negotiate with the union if it can 
prove that the union no longer enjoys majority support.  In order to allow 
for employers to determine this in the face of questions about union 
support, the Board allows for the employer to petition for a decertification 
election based on “good faith reasonable uncertainty” about the 
continuing majority status.372  However, an employer is allowed to poll its 
employees if it has good faith reasonable doubt about continuing majority 
status.373  Thus, doubt is enough to enable the employer to poll, and the 
poll may provide the employer with evidence that the union no longer 
enjoys majority support.374  In the alternative, uncertainty – as evidenced 
by employee dissatisfaction – will be sufficient to allow an employer to 
call an election as to the union’s continued support.375
There are substantial policy reasons for making it difficult for 
employees to decertify a union.  However, such difficulties also impose a 
cost.  Because of the difficulties of exit, there is a higher premium placed 
on employees’ ability to make the correct decision at the beginning.
5. The NLRB does not police misrepresentations in the union 
representation campaign.
369 See G. Robert Blakey & Ronald Goldstock, "On the Waterfront": RICO and Labor 
Racketeering, 17 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 341, 344 (1980) (recognizing that the contract-bar 
rule allows the employer and union to benefit from a "sweetheart" contract).
370
 Levitz Furniture of the Pacific, 333 NLRB 717, 717 (2001).
371 See Allentown Mack Sales & Services v. NLRB, 522 U.S. 359 (1998).
372 Levitz, 333 NLRB at 717, 723.
373 Id. at 723.
374
 In an unfair labor practice hearing, the employer would bear the burden of proving 
actual loss of majority support.  Id. at 725.
375 See id. at 728-29.
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As discussed previously,376 the Board has held that misrepresentations 
do not violate the Board’s “laboratory conditions” as longs as such 
misrepresentations are not akin to forgery.377  In summarizing the 
rationale for its policy, the Board stated:
In addition to finding [a more restrictive] rule to be 
unwieldy and counterproductive, we also consider it to 
have an unrealistic view of the ability of voters to assess 
misleading campaign propaganda. As is clear from an 
examination of our treatment of misrepresentations under 
the Wagner Act, the Board had long viewed employees as 
aware that parties to a campaign are seeking to achieve 
certain results and to promote their own goals. Employees, 
knowing these interests, could not help but greet the 
various claims made during a campaign with natural 
skepticism. The "protectionism" propounded by the [the 
earlier] rule is simply not warranted. On the contrary, as we 
found in Shopping Kart, "we believe that Board rules in 
this area must be based on a view of employees as mature 
individuals who are capable of recognizing campaign 
propaganda for what it is and discounting it."378
If, as Craig Becker has noted, the representation election is akin to a 
political campaign,379 a hands-off policy towards the hurly-burly world of 
campaigning might be an appropriate one.380  However, such a stance is 
anathema in the world of contracts, where fraud is universally prohibited.  
Common law fraud prohibits deception that leads to reliance, and in some 
circumstances even a failure to disclose can constitute deception.  
However, many contractual regulatory schemes have developed stricter 
prohibitions against misrepresentations.  In the securities context, for 
example, federal securities law have several express and implied causes 
376 See supra Part I.B.4.
377
 Midland Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 263 NLRB 127, 131-32 (1982).
378 Id. at 132 (quoting Shopping Kart Food Market, Inc., 228 NLRB 1311, 1313 (1978)).
379 See Becker, supra note CB1.
380 See Evan Richman, Note, Deception in Political Advertising: The Clash Between the 
First Amendment and Defamation Law, 16 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 667, 670 (1998) 
(noting the lack of regulation for misrepresentations in the political arena).
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of actions against misrepresentations.381  Perhaps the most important 
antifraud provision is Rule 10b-5, which prohibits misrepresentations or 
misleading omissions in the context of the purchase or sale of a 
security.382  Rule 10b-5 offers substantially more protection against 
misrepresentations than traditional common law fraud.383  There has been 
little controversy about Rule 10b-5 basic mission: to eliminate 
misrepresentations and misleading omissions in the market for 
securities.384
Thus, unlike pretty much any other product market, there is no check 
against fraud in the market for union representation services, except in the 
very narrowest of circumstances.  This failure to police against fraud is 
yet another reason for concern about the quality of information available 
to employees.
6. Market failures contribute to a lack of public confidence in the market 
for union representation.
The percentage of private employees represented by unions has 
steadily declined from the 1950s up until this year.385  These declines 
come in the face of polls showing overall public support for unions.  For 
example, recent polls show that a majority of the public approve of labor 
381 In addition to Rule 10b-5, which prohibits misrepresentations or omissions in 
connection with the purchase or sale of a security, § 11(a) of the Securities Act, see 15 
U.S.C. § 77k(a) (2000), prohibits a false statement of a material fact in a registration 
statement, and § 12(a)(2) of the Act, see id. § 77l(a)(2), imposes liability for a false 
statement of material fact in a prospectus.
382 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2006).
383 See Matthew T. Bodie, Aligning Incentives with Equity: Employee Stock Options and 
Rule 10b-5, 88 IOWA L. REV. 539, 595-96 (2003).
384 Commentators on both sides of the mandatory disclosure debate agree that securities 
markets need strong antifraud protection.  See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC 
ANALYSIS OF LAW 486-89 (5th ed. 1998) (arguing that many aspects of securities 
regulation may impede the flow of information to investors, but noting that investors 
should be protected from fraud); Alan R. Palmiter, Toward Disclosure Choice in 
Securities Offerings, 1999 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1, 130 ("A critical adjunct to my 
proposal of disclosure choice is that issuers in public offerings would be subject to a 
mandatory antifraud standard--namely, Rule 10b-5 liability.").  Cf. Macey & Miller, 
supra note MM1, at 390 ("The social value of preventing fraud in the sale of securities is 
too clear to require elaboration.").
385
 Bureau of Labor Statistics, Union Members Summary, January 20, 2006, available 
at: http://www.bls.gov/news.release/union2.nr0.htm.
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unions and believe that unions are good for the economy.386   However, 
there is some evidence of concerns about union competence.  According 
to one poll, 71 percent agreed that the government ought to do more to 
protect union members from corrupt union officials.387  Certainly, images 
of union corruption have inundated the public since the 1950s.  The 1957-
1958 Senate hearings on union corruption, chaired by Senator John 
McClellan and staffed by Robert Kennedy, brought to light many 
instances of union corruption, including ties with organized crime.388
Episodes of malfeasance by union officials continue.  Congress, courts, 
and commentators have struggled with the best methods of curtail such 
corruption and have resorted to such extraordinary measures as forced 
judicial trusteeships with no set time limits.389  While the federal 
government has had significant success in removing organized crime 
from certain unions,390 the shadow remains.  And in the popular media, 
shows such as “The Sopranos” portray unions as mere vessels for mafia 
control of certain industries.391
In the capital markets, mandatory disclosure has been called upon to 
shore up public confidence in securities.  The need for public confidence 
was touted as a key purpose for the New Deal securities legislation392 and 
has been cited repeatedly as justification for further mandatory 
386 See, e.g., Heather Mason Kiefer, Public Remains Positive About Labor Unions, 
Sept.13, 2005, available at: http://poll.gallup.com/content/default.aspx?ci=12751 
(showing that 58% approve of labor unions and 54% believe that unions are good for the 
U.S. economy); John Zogby et al., Nationwide Attitudes Toward Unions, Feb. 26, 2004, 
available at: http://psrf.org/info/Nationwide_Attitudes_Toward_Unions_2004.pdf
(public poll finding that 63 percent approve of labor unions).
387
 Zogby et al., supra note JZ1, at 15.
388
 Michael J. Nelson, Note, Slowing Union Corruption: Reforming the Landrum-Griffin 
Act to Better Combat Union Embezzlement, 8 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 527, 532-37 (2000).
389
 For an in-depth discussion of two such trusteeships, see Clyde W. Summers, Union 
Trusteeships and Union Democracy, 24 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM  689 (1991)
390
 Jim Jacobs has discussed the federal government’s role in eliminating mob influence 
from unions extensively.  See, e.g., JAMES B. JACOBS, MOBSTERS, UNIONS AND FEDS: 
THE MAFIA AND THE AMERICAN LABOR MOVEMENT (2005); James B. Jacobs et al., The 
RICO Trusteeships After Twenty Years: A Progress Report, 19 LAB. LAW. 419 (2004); 
James B. Jacobs & Ellen Peters, Labor Racketeering: The Mafia and the Unions, 30 
CRIME & JUST. 229 (2003).
391 The Sopranos (HBO broadcast, 1999-2006).
392
 Joel Seligman, The Historical Need for a Mandatory Corporate Disclosure System, 9 
J. CORP. L. 1, 51 (1983).
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disclosure.393  The Sarbanes-Oxley Act was perhaps in large part an effort 
to restore investor confidence after the shocks of 2001 and 2002.394
Although some commentators have criticized the lack of empirical 
support for this justification,395 there is no question that market 
confidence encourages investment in equities.396  In fact, the system of 
public securities regulation could be considered a government subsidy to 
investors and issuers.  By taking steps to insure the integrity of the 
markets, the government saves investors and issuers enforcement costs 
that they would otherwise bear.  Our securities market would not be as 
strong without this system of public intervention.397
One purpose of mandatory disclosure is to make fraud more difficult.  
Passed in the midst of the bust following the boom of the 1920s, the New 
Deal securities acts aimed at eliminating fraud through greater disclosure 
and penalties for noncompliance.  Required disclosure was seen as a way 
of bringing more “sunlight,” in Brandeis’ famous phrase, into the inner 
workings of corporate shares.398  Preventing fraud was only one end of 
the spectrum, however.  On the other end, proponents and enforcers of the 
New Deal acts hoped that the outflow of information would lead to better 
pricing and trading on the markets.  The Acts, particularly the 1933 Act, 
were seen as a way of making sure the securities markets acted rationally.  
In a 1933 article supporting the legislation, William O. Douglas and 
George E. Bates wrote that the effects of the 1933 Act would be: “(1) 
prevention of excesses and fraudulent transactions, which will be 
hampered and deterred merely by the requirement that their deals be 
revealed; and (2) placing in the market during the early stages of the life 
of a security a body of facts which, operating indirectly through 
393
 Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note EF1, at 692 (“The justification most commonly 
offered for mandatory disclosure rules is that they are necessary to ‘preserve confidence’ 
in the capital markets.”).
394
 Troy A. Paredes, Blinded by the Light: Information Overload and Its Consequences 
for Securities Regulation, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 417 (2003) (stating that the August 2002 
financial statement certifications required under Sarbanes-Oxley helped convince 
investors that firms as a whole were not dishonest or poorly-run).
395 Id. at 693.
396 Id.
397 See Black, supra note BB1, at 782-85.
398 See LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY AND HOW BANKERS USE IT 92 
(1914) (“Publicity is justly commended as a remedy for social and industrial diseases.  
Sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants; electric light the most efficient 
policeman.”).  
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investment services and expert investors, will tend to produce more 
accurate appraisal of the worth of the security . . . .”399  Echoing the 
thoughts of Douglas and Bates, the SEC later explained the purpose of the 
1933 Act as twofold:
The Securities Act, often referred to as the ‘truth in 
securities’ Act, was designed not only to provide investors 
with adequate information upon which to base their 
decisions to buy and sell securities, but also to protect 
legitimate business seeking to obtain capital through honest 
protestation against competition from crooked promoters . . 
. .
400
Mandatory disclosure will not prevent fraud; the securities markets 
amply demonstrate that.  But mandatory disclosure creates a market 
environment that is richer in information and less susceptible to breed the 
most overt kinds of fraud.  Such an environment will help boost public 
confidence in the market itself.  Just as mandatory disclosure has been 
employed to improve public confidence in the securities markets, it may 
be useful in boosting public confidence in the market for union 
representation.  
PART IV: DISCLOSURE UNDER THE LABOR-MANAGEMENT REPORTING 
AND DISCLOSURE ACT
Although a regime of information disclosure would be new for the 
union representation campaign, it would not be for unions themselves.  
The National Labor Relations Board regulates the relationship between 
union and employers and creates the regulatory regime for the initial 
choice by employees whether or not to join a union.  The Department of 
399
 William O. Douglas & George E. Bates, The Federal Securities Act of 1933, 43 YALE 
L.J. 171, 172 (1933).
400
 10 S.E.C. Ann. Rep. 14 (1944).  See also Securities and Exchange Commission, The 
Work of the Securities and Exchange Commission 1 (1967) (stating that the New Deal 
Acts require disclosure so that “investors may make a realistic appraisal of the merits of 
securities and thus exercise an informed judgment in determining whether to purchase 
them”), quoted in George J. Bentson, The Effectiveness and Effects of the SEC’s 
Accounting Disclosure Requirements, in ECONOMIC POLICY AND THE REGULATION OF 
CORPORATE SECURITIES 23, 24 (Henry G. Manne, ed. 1969).
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Labor oversees the management and organization of the union itself, 
including internal union elections and a union’s relationship with its 
members.  While the NLRB may not require disclosure in the 
representation election context, the Department of Labor requires unions 
to provide extensive disclosure to their members. 401  This disclosure is 
provided for by the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act 
(LMRDA or Landrum-Griffin Act), and covers much of the union’s 
internal governance and finances.  Thus, a system of mandatory 
disclosure in the representation context could piggyback off the existing 
LMRDA system, if there is overlap between the two sets of disclosures.
Labor organization disclosures are set forth in Title II of the LMRDA.  
Section 201(a) of the Act requires unions to provide the Department of 
Labor with a copy of its constitution and bylaws.402  In addition, the union 
is required to file a report providing the names and titles of union officers, 
the union’s dues and fees structure, and detailed statements about the 
union’s procedures for such matters as qualifications for or restrictions on 
membership, authorization for disbursement of funds, audit of financial 
transactions of the labor organization, the calling of regular and special 
meetings, the selection of officers and stewards, imposition of fines, 
suspensions, and expulsions of members, authorization for bargaining 
demands, ratification of contract terms, and authorization for strikes.403
Section 201(b) of the Act requires that unions file annual reports, signed 
by the president and treasurer, disclosing details about the union’s 
401 In many ways, the split between the two systems resembles the split in regulation of 
the sale of securities.  The federal system of required disclosure for the sale of corporate 
securities proceeds largely in two steps.  First, before a firm decides to offer a security 
for sale, it must proffer extensive information about itself, its finances, its prospects, the 
expected price, and other information deemed relevant to potential buyers.  Second, once 
the security has been sold to initial buyers and thereafter is traded on the public markets, 
firms have a continuing obligation to disclose relevant financial information, insider 
transactions, executive compensation, and other matters relevant to the security’s value.  
Each step is established largely by one of the New Deal securities acts: the Securities 
Act of 1933 is primarily about initial disclosure, while the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934 primarily concerns the trading of securities on public markets. THOMAS L. HAZEN, 
TREATISE ON THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION [ch. 1] (4th ed. 2002).  In this 
respect, as in the market for union representation, there are two disclosure paradigms: 
one for the initial “purchase” and one for “members” after purchase.
402
 29 U.S.C. § 431(a) (2000).
403 Id.
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financial condition and operations.404  Specifically, the Act requires 
disclosure of assets and liabilities, receipts during the year and sources for 
the receipts, salaries and other disbursements for all officers and 
employees making more than $10,000, loans of more than $250 to 
officers and employees, all loans to business enterprises, and “other 
disbursements made by [the union].”405   The Secretary of the Department 
of Labor is given authority to prescribe the rules and regulations for filing 
the annual reports.406
Since 1960 the Department of Labor has provided forms through 
which unions meet the disclosure requirements under Landrum-Griffin.  
Form LM-1 is the initial form that covers the requirements of § 201(a) of 
the Act.407   Forms LM-2, LM-3, and LM-4 are the annual reports that 
cover a union’s organizational and financial disclosure under LMRDA § 
201(a) and (b).  Form LM-2 is the form for largest unions; the amounts 
changed over time, but recent 2003 amendments placed the threshold at 
unions with receipts of $250,000 or more.408  The Department of Labor 
estimates that while only twenty percent of unions meet this threshold, 
these unions received about ninety-three percent of the total dollars 
received annually by unions.409  Forms LM- 3 and LM-4 are simplified 
forms for smaller unions.410  In 2003, the Department of Labor gave the 
regulations their first significant overhaul in more than forty years.  What 
follows is a more detailed discussion of the disclosure requirements 
provided for by the Department of Labor’s regulations.
A. Dues and Fees
The initial form requires that the union set forth its dues and fees 
structure.411  All three forms provide for the disclosure of the dues and 
404
 29 U.S.C. § 431(b) (2000).
405 Id.
406 Id. § 438.
407
 29 C.F.R. §§ 402.2-402.3 (2006).
408
 29 C.F.R. § 403.2(d) (2006).
409 Recent Regulation, supra note RR1, at 1736.
410
 Form LM-3 is a four-page report for unions with receipts less than $200,000, 29 
C.F.R. § 403.4(a)(1) (2006), and Form LM-4 is a two-page report for unions with 
receipts of less than $10,000, id. § 403.4(a)(2).
411
 Form LM-1 Labor Organization Information Report 2, available at: 
http://www.dol.gov/esa/regs/compliance/olms/GPEA_Forms/LM%20-%201p.pdf. 
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fees required by the union for members.412  The categories are: regular 
dues and fees, initiation fees, transfer fees, and work permits.413
B. Organizational Structure
The union is required to disclose a number of facts about its 
organizational structure.  In its initial filing, the union is required to 
provide a copy of its constitution and bylaws to the Department of 
Labor.414  In conjunction with these governing documents, the union must 
prepare a report citing to the page, section, and/or paragraph number of 
the governing documents that cover certain procedures.  As noted in the 
discussion of LMRDA § 201(a), these procedures include qualifications 
for or restrictions on membership, authorization for disbursement of 
funds, audit of financial transactions of the labor organization, the calling 
of regular and special meetings, the selection of officers and stewards, 
imposition of fines, suspensions, and expulsions of members, 
authorization for bargaining demands, ratification of contract terms, and 
authorization for strikes.415 The initial report also requires the union to 
list its officers, as well as the date of the next election.416  In its annual 
financial report, the union is required to list all of its officers,417 the date 
of its next election of officers,418 and the number of members it has.419
C. Financial Disclosure
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 Form LM-2 Labor Organization Annual Report 2, available at: 
http://www.dol.gov/esa/regs/compliance/olms/lm2_blankForm.pdf; Form LM-3 Labor 
Organization Annual Report 2, available at: 
http://www.dol.gov/esa/regs/compliance/olms/lm3_blankForm.pdf; Form LM-4 Labor 
Organization Annual Report 2, available at: 
http://www.dol.gov/esa/regs/compliance/olms/lm4_blankForm.pdf.
413
 Form LM-2, supra note LM2, at 2; Form LM-3, supra note LM3, at 2.  Form LM-2 
also includes a category for “working” dues and fees, as opposed to regular dues and 
fees.  Form LM-2, supra note LM2, at 2.  Form LM-4 only requires the union to report 
any changes in its dues or fees structure.  Form LM-4, supra note LM4, at 2.
414
 29 C.F.R. § 402.1 (2006).
415
 Form LM-1, supra note LM-1, at 3.
416
 Form LM-1, supra note LM-1, at 2.
417
 Form LM-2, supra note LM2, at Schedule 11; Form LM-3, supra note LM3, at 3.
418
 Form LM-2, supra note LM2, at 2; Form LM-3, supra note LM3, at 2.
419
 Form LM-2, supra note LM2, at 2; Form LM-3, supra note LM3, at 2; Form LM-4, 
supra note LM4, at 2.
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Prior to the 2003 changes to the regulations, the Department of 
Labor asked unions to disclose their overall assets and liabilities, as well 
as their general receipts and disbursements.420 Unions are now not only 
required to list their general receipts and disbursements, but to itemize 
them as well (for amounts greater than $5,000).421  Separate schedules 
provide for the itemization of accounts receivable,422 loans receivable,423
investments and fixed assets,424 and other assets and liabilities.425  Unions 
must also itemize individual receipts and disbursements made to support 
particular union functions, such as contract negotiation and 
administration, organizing, and political activities.426  In addition to these 
itemizations, unions must also break down the time each officer or 
employee spends on the various activities of the organization.427
D. Example: Local Union 1199, Service Employees International Union
Looking at an actual set of disclosures may assist in illuminating the 
nature and extent of those disclosures.  The 2004 LM-2 provided by 
Local 1199 of the Service Employees International Union is one such 
example;428 it is available online through a search of the Department of 
Labor’s website.429  The 196-page document provides the annual 
420 See Recent Regulation, supra note RR1, at 1735.
421
 68 Fed. Reg. 58,374, 58,429-30 (Oct. 9, 2003).
422
 Form LM-2, supra note LM2, at Schedule 1.
423 Id. at Schedule 2.
424 Id. at Schedule 3 (sales of investments and fixed assets); Schedule 4 (purchases of 
investments and fixed assets); Schedule 5 (investments); Schedule 6 (fixed assets).
425 Id. at Schedule 7 (other assets); Schedule 10 (other liabilities).
426 See id.  Schedule 14 covers “other receipts,” schedule 15 covers “contract negotiation 
and administration,” schedule 16 covers “organizing,” schedule 17 covers “political 
activities,” schedule 18 covers “lobbying,” schedule 19 covers “contributions, gifts, and 
grants,” schedule 20 covers “benefits,” schedule 21 covers “general overhead,” and 
schedule 22 covers “other disbursements.”  See also Form LM-2 Labor Organization 
Annual Report 18, available at: 
http://www.dol.gov/esa/regs/compliance/olms/lm2_blankForm.pdf. 
427
 68 Fed. Reg. at 58,471; Form LM-2, supra note LM2, at Schedule 11.
428
 Form LM-2 Labor Organization Annual Report, Local 1199, Service Employees 
International Union, March 28, 2005 (on file with author) [hereinafter Local 1199 Form 
LM-2].
429
 The Department of Labor, Office of Labor-Management Standards, maintains a 
website through which it is possible to obtain electronic versions of union annual 
reports.  Department of Labor, LMRDA Reporting and Public Disclosure, at: 
http://www.dol.gov/esa/regs/compliance/olms/rrlo/lmrda.htm. 
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disclosure for Local 1199, one of the largest and most successful unions 
in the country.430  According to the 2004 form, Local 1199 has 240,000 
members, roughly $60 million in assets, and roughly $15 million in 
liabilities.431  Dues range from $13.00 to $75.00, with initiation fees 
ranging from $75 to $200.432  The union received over $100 million in 
dues, and total receipts were over $137 million.  The LM-2 also provides 
a breakdown of investments, fixed assets, other assets, sales and 
purchases of investments and assets, and loans payable.433
The LM-2 also provides a list of all officers as well as their total 
compensation.  The form lists 131 officers who receive a total of over $5 
million in total compensation.434  Union president Dennis Rivera received 
$147,710 in total compensation for 2004.435  The next regular election of 
officers is not until June 2007.436  The form also itemizes all 
disbursements to employees; each employee is listed by name, title, and 
total compensation.437  Finally, there are schedules for benefits, 
contributions, gifts, and grants, office and administrative expenses, and 
other receipts and disbursements.438
How much of this information would be useful for employees 
contemplating joining SEIU?  How likely are they to obtain it?  If they 
obtain it, how likely are they to read it?  Below is an effort to begin 
answering these questions. 
PART V.  A NEW MODEL FOR REPRESENTATION ELECTION REGULATION
The primary purpose of this paper is to begin the conversation about a 
new model for regulating the union representation election.  The current 
system is a strange admixture of ambiguous and heavy-handed 
requirements about what may be said combined with a completely hands-
off approach to what must be said.  As a result, unions and employers 
430
 For more information about Local 1199, visit their website at: 
http://www.1199seiu.org/.  
431
 Local 1199 Form LM-2, supra note 1199LM, at 2, 3.
432 Id. at 2.
433 Id. at Schedules 1 through 8.
434 Id. at Schedule 9.
435 Id.
436 Id. at 2.
437 Id. at Schedule 10.
438 Id. at Schedules 11 though 15.
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must step carefully during the campaign so as to avoid statements or 
behavior that violate the Board’s “laboratory conditions” doctrine.  At the 
same time, the Board makes no effort to ensure that employees get the 
information they need to make an economically rational decision, other 
than to provide unions with the names and addresses of those workers 
whom they are courting.  The resulting system may be the worst of all 
possible worlds.
In order to redesign the regulation surrounding the union 
representation election, I propose three facets to a new regulatory model: 
(a) required disclosure by unions, (b) required disclosure by employers if 
they wish to participate in the campaign, and (c) a more hands-off 
approach to regulation, except in the case of misrepresentation.  These 
three reforms are discussed in more detail below.
A.  Required Union Disclosure
As discussed in Part IV, there is reason to believe that the union 
representation election process suffers from informational failures.  
Information is distributed asymmetrically, and unions and employers may 
lack the proper incentives to insure that employees get the information 
they need to make the decision.  As in the securities regulation context, as 
well as many other contractual contexts, a system of mandatory 
information disclosure would be useful in ensuring that consumers get 
relevant information.
What would such a system look like?  My hope is that this article 
will spur debate about exactly this question.  But I would like to set forth 
a few preliminary thoughts the content of the disclosure, as well as the 
means of delivering that content to employees.
1. Content
What sorts of information are relevant and material to the union 
representation question?  The answer may vary by election, by individual, 
and by time period.  Further empirical research would be extremely 
useful in determining exactly what workers want to know in making their 
decision.439  The following categories serve as a starting point in 
determining what data workers might want.
439
 As discussed earlier, one empirical study discounted the importance of information 
received by employees during the campaign.  See GETMAN ET AL., supra note JG1, at 
62-64 (finding employees generally voted as they thought they would before the 
campaign), 76-80 (finding a low recognition rate for campaign issues), 140-43 (arguing 
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(a) Dues and fees.  Obviously, employees would want to know how 
much their dues would be and what initiation fees would be required.  
The LMRDA requires disclosure of union dues in both the union’s initial 
filings and in its annual reports.440  As the Local 1199 SEIU example 
demonstrates, however, the union may disclose a range of dues and fees, 
rather than a specific amount.  In such cases, employees would want to 
know exactly how much the union is proposing to charge in their 
particular case.
Employees may also want a sense of whether those dues are likely 
to change in the next few years.  Given the difficulties of exit, employees 
are essentially signing up for a three-year contract when they agree to 
union representation.  Although unions may not know what their future 
financial needs will be, they may have information about future dues 
prices that would be useful to the employees’ decision.  The union could 
be required to disclose whether any dues or fees hikes are set to be voted 
on by the members, or whether union officials have plans for such an 
increase in the upcoming year.
(b) Organizational structure.  Like any organization, potential 
members generally would want to know how the union is structured and 
what its policies are for members.  The union must disclose its 
constitution and bylaws under the LMRDA.  Form LM-1 asks the union 
to list such information as qualifications for or restrictions on 
membership, authorization for disbursement of funds, the types of audits 
the labor organization undergoes, the calling of regular and special 
meetings, the selection of officers and stewards, the circumstances under 
which fines, suspensions, or expulsions can be imposed, and the 
requirements for authorizing bargaining demands, contract terms, and 
strikes.441  In addition, members may want to know who the union 
officials are, their backgrounds, and perhaps even their salaries.442  Form 
that hands-off regulation is proper, given the lack of importance to the campaign itself).  
However, as noted, critics have charged that the data did not support the authors’ 
normative claims.  See supra text accompanying notes XXX-YYY.  In addition, the 
study was focused on whether the campaign affected workers’ attitudes, not whether 
workers were getting the information they needed to make economically rational 
decisions.
440
 Form LM-1, supra note LM1; Form LM-2, supra note LM2.
441 Id.
442
 The question of salaries is likely to provoke some controversy.  On the one hand, 
corporations are required to disclose salary information under federal securities law on 
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LM-2 requires the disclosure of officials and disbursements to officials.  
Officials could also be required to provide a short biography that included 
certain specific facts, such as education, work experience, criminal 
record, and time with the union.
(c) Nature and Quality of Services.  Perhaps the most important set of 
information for employees would concern the nature and quality of the 
representation services provided by the union.  As noted earlier,443 there 
is a distinct information asymmetry with respect to information about the 
union’s services.  Employees who have never belonged to the union do 
not know how well the union will do in negotiating new terms, avoiding 
strikes, managing grievances, and keeping dues low.  When buying a 
product, consumers can often see and handle the product, and they are 
often given the right to return the product if they find it unsatisfactory.  
Home buyers hire inspectors, tour the home, and still benefit from 
mandatory disclosure requirements on the part of the seller.  But union 
consumers have a much tougher time predicting how effective the union 
will be in providing services.
There may be ways to get information about performance to
employees making a representation decision.  The union’s past and 
current collective bargaining agreements provide concrete facts about the 
terms and conditions the union has negotiated for other employees.  
Having access to these contracts would provide a way for workers to 
comparison-shop.  A more speculative form of information would be 
union predictions about what they expect to negotiate with the employer.  
The union might present information about what its initial demands 
would be, and it could even provide information about what it expects to 
get.  It could even disclose the risks that the union will not be able to 
the theory that shareholders should know what their agents are making.  See 17 C.F.R. § 
229.402 (2006); cf. SEC Release Nos. 33-8655, 34-53185 (January 27, 2006), available 
at: http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/33-8655.pdf (proposing new rules for executive 
compensation disclosure).  Given that union members have some of the same agency 
costs concerns that shareholders do, compensation information may be material.  See
Schwab, supra note SS1, at 377-83.  However, the purchasers oif services generally do 
not have the right to see the executive compensation for the company from whom they 
are buying the services.  To the extent that employees are simply consumers of union 
representation services, such information could be much less relevant in comparison to 
the quality of the services.  Cf. Estreicher, supra note SE1, at 516-17 (arguing that for-
profit unions should be allowed to provide union representation services).
443 See supra Part III.B.1.
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negotiate a contract, or the risk that the union will call the employees out 
on strike at the risk of permanent replacement.
In the world of securities regulation, firms making an initial public 
offering are required to disclose reams of financial information about 
itself.444  Companies are even expected to make predictions about what 
future events may damages their prospects of being successful in 
business.445  One could envision a disclosure statement in which unions 
provided a richer vision of what they expected to achieve and the 
difficulties they contemplated facing as part of a mandatory disclosure 
statement.  Of course, unions would generally endeavor to be a non-
specific as possible, in order to avoid recriminations or liability down the 
road.  Unions could also plausibly argue that such statements would 
reveal too much of their strategies and would enable the employer to get 
an advantage in bargaining.  As we consider a mandatory disclosure 
regime, the pros and cons of such “softer” statements should be 
considered along side the disclosure of “harder” financial data.
(d) Conflicts of Interest.  The corporate world places a premium on 
disclosure whenever a potential conflict of interest arises between a 
corporate officer and the corporation he or she serves.446  Employees are 
entitled to know about any potential conflict of interest between the union 
and the employer.  Evidence of such a conflict would be any overlap 
between union personnel and the employer’s personnel, including spouses 
and other close relatives, or financial ties between the union and the 
employer.447  Current or past collective bargaining relationships between 
the union and the employer (or an associated company) might also be 
grounds for a conflict of interest.  Moreover, any contracts between the 
employer and its affiliates and the union (or its affiliates) should also be 
disclosed to employees.  They key here would be to have a sweep broad 
444 See supra text accompanying notes AAA-BBB.
445 See 17 C.F.R. § 229.303 (2006) (“Describe any known trends or uncertainties that 
have had or that the registrant reasonably expects will have a material favorable or 
unfavorable impact on net sales or revenues or income from continuing operations.”).
446 See, e.g., State ex rel. Hayes Oyster Co. v. Keypoint Oyster Co. 391 P.2d 979, 986
(Wash. 1964) (“A corporation cannot ratify the breach of fiduciary duties unless full and 
complete disclosure of all facts and circumstances is made by the fiduciary and an 
intentional relinquishment by the corporation of its rights.”).
447
 Such ties could be quite attenuated.  It would be important to identify all companies 
in which the employer had a significant ownership stake and to include those companies 
in any analysis.
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enough to encompass all of the potential conflicts.  For example, Teri 
Moore may be president of the United Forever Union (UFU) and may 
negotiate a fairly employer-friendly contract with Blue Industries.  If Teri 
also is the treasurer for Americans United Union (AUU), and AUU is 
seeking to represent employees of Aquamarine Industries, a subsidiary of 
Blue Industries, then Aquamarine employees should be told about and 
given access to the UFU contract with Blue.  The regulations would have 
to be written to prevent employers and unions from avoiding the 
disclosure requirements simply by creating new corporations or labor 
organizations.
2. Delivery
Given the plethora of potentially relevant information available to 
disclose, the Board would have to determine the best method for selecting 
the disclosure and then delivering it to employees.  In terms of selecting 
the information, the Board would face a difficult choice.  On the one 
hand, the Board would want to keep the information disclosure as concise 
as possible, in order to make it more accessible to employees.  Recent 
concerns about “information overload” have led commentators to 
reexamine the amount of required disclosure in the realm of securities.448
On the other hand, some employees might be willing to spend the extra 
time to dig through a larger amount of disclosure and would find the extra 
information useful or even critical in making their decision.  Given that 
union elections can be determined by one employees out of hundreds, it 
may make sense to give the marginal employee as much information as 
he or she desires.
Technology may provide the answer to this dilemma.  The Board 
could provide for the mandatory disclosure in two steps.  The first step 
would be a short form distributed to al employees with a few pieces of 
critical information included.  The second step would be an Internet 
website that would provide access to all of the other information the 
448
 Paredes, supra note TP1, at 419.  Paredes notes that if a rational actor is forced to 
process too much data in making a cost-benefit analysis, the actor may adopt one of 
several decisionmaking heuristics which do not always process the information in a 
rational manner.  Id. at 437-43.  While acknowledging that most investors rely on expert 
“filters” such as mutual funds, research analysts, and the business media in making 
investment decisions, Paredes cites to evidence that these filters are themselves subject 
to information overload.  Id. at 452-59.  While making no affirmative policy proposals, 
Paredes counsels that “securities regulation needs to focus to a greater extent on the user 
of information.”  Id. at 485.
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Board required to be disclosed.  In this manner, all employees would be 
given a set of disclosure that many would be likely to read.  At the same 
time, the few more industrious employees would have channeled access 
to important information that may take much longer to absorb.
The primary issue surrounding the first step would be determining the 
exact scope of the information to be provided.  While the Board would 
want to gather more information and could even consider rulemaking on 
this issue,449 commentators may want to focus on determining what sorts 
of information employees most want and how to convey that information 
most concisely.  Union dues and fees applicable to the voting employees, 
for example, could be specified briefly.  Terms and conditions of 
employment in the union’s other collective bargaining agreements could 
not.  To some extent, the Board might want to use the short form to tip off 
employees about information they could get through the website.  
However, for the most part the Board would want to keep the short form 
as a simple summary of the most critical facts about the union and its 
services.
The primary issues surrounding the second step would be the design 
of the website, the costs in implementing the system, and the likelihood 
that employees would benefit from the system.  In terms of the design, 
this again is an issue for future policy development by the Board.  It 
should be fairly straightforward, however, to design a standard page for 
each election which would provide access to the additional sets of 
information.  The Department of Labor has brought its entire LMRDA
disclosure system online, making it fairly simple to link to the 
Department of Labor’s website or even directly link to the particular 
union’s disclosure within the Department’s database. 450  Other 
documents, such as the union’s past and present collective bargaining 
agreements, could be posted to the page as documents that could be 
449
 For a discussion of the Board’s antipathy towards rulemaking, see Joan Flynn, The 
Costs and Benefits of “Hiding the Ball”: NLRB Policymaking and the Failure of 
Judicial Review, 75 B.U. L. REV. 387 (1995).
450 See Final Regulations, 68 Fed. Reg. at X; Department of Labor, LMRDA Reporting 
& Disclosure, at: http://www.dol.gov/esa/regs/compliance/olms/rrlo/lmrda.htm.  
Interestingly, ERISA has a requirement that the Secretaries of Labor and the Treasury 
work together when they are requesting similar information.  29 U.S.C. § 1204 (2000).  
The NLRB could similarly work with other branches of the Department of Labor to 
make sure that LMRDA-required information was provided to employees in the midst of 
a union organizing drive. 
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downloaded. Moreover, the page could also link to the union’s website in 
order to provide access to information.  In terms of costs, it is fairly 
simple to create a webpage, and Board technicians could use the same 
web design for each representation election.  It would be far more simple 
to post electronic versions of collective bargaining agreements on the 
web, as opposed to photocopying these agreements and distributing them 
to employees.  Finally, there is some question as to whether employees 
would use such a system.  However, computer ownership and Internet use 
continue to grow across the country.451  Many employees have access to 
the Internet at work.  As many other commentators have suggested, using 
the web is a cost-effective, extremely accessible method of distributing 
lots of information to a large number of employees.452  It can overcome 
the Lechmere access problems that have made it difficult for information 
to reach employees.  Combining access to the union with access to 
mandatory disclosure about the union would provide an ideal mix of 
information to employees.
B.  Employer Disclosure
This article has focused primarily on the need for employees to 
get information about the union offering its services.  Given that unions 
are seeking to provide services on behalf of the employees, it makes sense 
to focus on their dues, internal organization, quality of services and 
potential conflicts of interest.  However, employees also find information 
about the employer relevant to their representation decision.  Although 
there is ample ground for further discussion and research, this article 
proposes a system of employer disclosure in which employers would be 
given an option.  The employer could provide a set of mandatory 
disclosures and then participate in the campaign, or the employer could 
remain neutral and provide no disclosure.  This option would provide 
451
 Recent polls have shown that 73 percent of Americans use the Internet.  Lawrence 
Rout, Broadband: Online Audience Grows--from Different Directions, WALL ST. J.,
Sept. 13, 2004, at R2.
452 See Martin H. Malin & Henry H. Perritt, Jr., The National Labor Relations Act in 
Cyberspace: Union Organizing in Electronic Workplaces, 49 U. KAN. L. REV. 1 (2000); 
Susan S. Robfogel, Electronic Communication and the NLRA: Union Access and 
Employer Rights, 16 LAB. L.J. 231 (2000); Gwynne A. Wilcox, Section 7 Rights of 
Employees and Union Access to Employees: Cyber Organizing, 16 LAB. L.J. 253 (2000); 
Elena N. Broder, Note, (Net)Workers’ Rights: The NLRA and Employee Electronic 
Communications, 105 YALE L. J. 1639 (1996); Wissinger, supra note MW1, at 347-48.
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employers with a choice.  They could contest the union’s efforts by 
putting their own cards on the table, or they could stay out of the process 
entirely.
What kinds of information would the employer provide?  Again, 
further research is necessary to determine exactly what kinds of employer 
information are relevant and important to making a rational union 
representation election.  Ties to the union are certainly relevant, and it 
may make sense to impose a duty on the employer to make disclosures 
about any potential conflicts of interest between itself and the union.  The 
company’s finances are also relevant, as its financial condition may 
dictate what level of wages and benefits it could provide to employees.  
Much of the information useful to potential shareholders would also be 
useful to employees contemplating unionization (albeit perhaps for 
different reasons).  In this regard, the Board could piggyback off 
disclosures made by publicly-traded companies to the SEC.  Like the 
Department of Labor’s web-based database of LMRDA disclosure, the 
SEC maintains EDGAR, an electronic database of all public disclosure by 
publicly-held companies.  The Board could provide a link to the 
employer’s disclosures through the election website, just as it would link 
to union disclosures at the website as well.
This system of optional disclosure would have two policy effects.  
The first effect would be to increase the availability and accessibility of 
information about the employer to employees.  The second effect would 
be to put a premium on employer participation within the campaign.  For 
large publicly-held companies, the disclosure might only mean providing 
another copy of information that is already publicly available.  For 
smaller, closely-held companies, however, the required disclosure would 
pose a significant burden.  Not only would the company have to collect 
the information, it would also have to disclose much of the previously-
private inner workings of the business organization.  Private companies 
may be private in part to avoid the SEC’s mandatory disclosure 
requirements.453  Avoiding such disclosure may be worth the costs of 
remaining neutral in an NLRB election.
This effect raises the possibility of either de facto or de jure
exclusion of the employer from the representation campaign.  It is now 
the received wisdom of the labor relations academy that employers 
453 COX & HAZEN, supra note CH1, at 644.
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effectively play on employees’ fears in conducting their antiunion 
campaigns.454  The primary justification for employer involvement in the 
union campaign is the employer’s role in providing negative information 
about the union to employees.455 If mandatory union disclosure provides 
much of the critical information that employers have traditionally 
provided, then perhaps employers should be excluded from the campaign.  
Such an exclusion, however, would have to overcome complicated free 
speech and informational concerns.456  On the other hand, a system of 
optional disclosure would put a price on participation – a price rationally 
related to representation election regulation.
C.  Reconfiguring Campaign Regulation
The Board’s regime of representation election regulation has long 
been criticized for its indeterminate and hair-splitting standards.457  Since 
the Board has not been all that concerned with managing the information 
in the campaign, the proposed system of disclosure would not necessarily 
affect the Board’s prohibitions on coercion, bribery, or inflammatory 
appeals; such regimes could coexist.  At the same time, a new disclosure 
regime might provide an opportunity for the Board to reexamine the 
current prohibitions and adopt a simpler, more streamlined system.  If the 
union and employer are providing critical information to the employees 
up front, then perhaps employees will place less emphasis on the 
information they learn from the participants during the campaign.  
However, given the different purposes of much of the Board’s regulation, 
454 See, e.g., Larry Cohen & Richard W. Hurd, Fear, Conflict and Union Organizing, in
ORGANIZING TO WIN: NEW RESEARCH ON UNION STRATEGIES 181, 181 (Kate 
Bronfenbrenner et al. eds., 1998).
455 See supra Part II.C.
456
 Section 8(c) of the NLRA, which was added by the Taft-Hartley amendments, 
provides: “The expressing of any views, argument, or opinion, or the dissemination 
thereof, whether in written, printed, graphic, or visual form, shall not constitute or be 
evidence of an unfair labor practice under any of the provisions of this subchapter, if 
such expression contains no threat of reprisal or force or promise of benefit.”  29 U.S.C. 
§ 158(c) (2000).  The Supreme Court has noted that § 8(c) “merely implements the First 
Amendment.”  NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 617 (1969).  However, the 
Board has held that since § 8(c) only applies to unfair labor practices, it can go beyond § 
8(c) in regulating representation campaigns.  See, e.g., General Shoe Corp., 77  NLRB 
124, 127 (1948).  Whether the First Amendment would prohibit complete employer 
exclusion is an open question.
457 See supra Part II.A.
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perhaps there need not be any changes to the Board’s efforts to regulation 
speech and conduct that has the tendency to coerce employees in the 
exercise of their choice.
However, there is one reform that would substantially supplement and 
strengthen the disclosure regime: penalties for misrepresentation and 
fraud.  Unlike perhaps every other regime of commercial regulation, the 
Board’s regulation of the union representation election does not penalize 
for fraud.  This failure is anathema to the need for employees to trust the 
information they are getting from unions and employers.  Required 
disclosures would be useless if there are no penalties for failures or 
misrepresentations in those disclosures.  The Board should, at the least, 
treat material misrepresentations as grounds for overturning an election, 
and it should treat any error or omission in the mandatory disclosure as 
per se material.  The Board could also consider stronger penalties such as 
monetary damages or injunctive relief.  In making a union representation 
decision, employees should be protected against fraud as consumers 
generally are when making economic decisions.458  The Board should not 
tolerate fraud.
D. Intended Effects of the New Regime
In laying out a framework for reform, I wish to conclude by talking 
about the two general goals of these reforms – two effects they should 
endeavor to create.  First, the disclosure regime should highlight many of 
the more egregious conflicts of interest between labor organizations and 
employers.  If ties between the union and company are highlighted for 
employees, employees will be in a much better position to police such 
ties.  Second, a more rational and organized system of information 
regulation will help employees make more informed and rational 
decisions.  And to the extent that employees could better trust the 
information they are getting, they may feel more comfortable to 
committing themselves to union membership.  Certainly, better 
information could lead to the result that even fewer employees decide to 
join unions.  But whatever the result, a system of disclosure would 
provide employees with the tools to better evaluate the decisions before 
458
 Kent Greenfield has criticized the lack of fraud protection for employees in the 
context of the labor market.  Kent Greenfield, The Unjustified Absence of Federal Fraud 
Protection in the Labor Market, 107 YALE L.J. 715 (1997).
INFORMATION & REPRESENTATION ELECTIONS
88
them.  In the long run, more rational decisions will mean more efficient 
ones, which will ultimately leave society better off.  
CONCLUSION
The Board, courts, and academic commentators have (with good 
reason) focused on employer coercion and administrative delay as key 
concerns in the regulation of the union representation election.  However, 
the critical role of information – information necessary to make an 
efficient representation decision – has been neglected.  This paper argues 
for a new approach to representation elections: one that creates disclosure 
requirements for both unions and employers, as well as one that 
empowers the Board to manage the flow of information to employees.  At 
the least, this new approach will help prevent conflicts of interest that 
despoil the relationship between a union and its members.  However, such 
a process may ultimately lead to a newly invigorated market for 
representation driven by a wiser, more informed class of employees.
